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SELECTION OF AJURY INA CIVIL CASE
BY KENNETH M.

WORMWOOD

Kenneth M. Wormwood is a
member of the Denver, Colorado
and American Bar Associations;
LL.B. University of Denver, 1926;
past president of Denver Bar Association; member of House of
Delegates of American Bar Association; and vice president of the
Federation of Insurance Counsel.

After having tried jury cases for 30 years, primarily on the
defense of damage suits, I have come to the conclusion that anyone who has the temerity to attempt to suggest to another attorney how to select a jury should be a fit subject for a psychiatrist.
There is no standard form or rule to follow in the selection of a
jury. Selecting a jury is like selecting a wife. You just don't know
what you are getting until it's too late. Seriously, there are many
problems involved in the selection of a jury.
While most attorneys are familiar with our Colorado statutes
regarding juries, no harm will be done 'by refreshing our memories
regarding these statutes. Under Colorado statutes, the jury consists of six persons unless the parties agree to a smaller number
but no less than three. A jury of twelve persons can be had, but
if either party desires a jury of twelve, then the party requesting
the extra jurors must deposit with the clerk an additional jury
fee sufficient to pay additional jurors for one day's service and
a like sum must be deposited every day thereafter consumed in
such trial. These additional jury fees are taxed as costs.
I have never tried a case in which there was a jury of less
than six persons and have tried quite a few where there were
twelve jurors. The question arises in each case as to whether a
jury of six or twelve is desired. In my early practice of the law,
I would demand twelve jurors when on the defense on the theory
that I was more apt to get a compromise verdict or defense verdict
with twelve jurors than with six. The theory being that because
the verdict had to be unanimous, it would be more difficult for
twelve people to agree than six people. After several years,, I
came to the conclusion that it was the exceptional case where a
jury of twelve should be demanded, that under our present jury
system and certainly under the theory that I use in selecting
juries, which theory I will go into later in this article, it was a
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waste of money and of time to ask for the six additional jurors.
Something that is oftentimes overlooked by counsel, particularly those who do not try too many cases, is Rule 38 of the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that any party
may demand a trial by jury by serving upon the other party a
demand therefore in writing at any time after the commencement
of the action and not later than ten days after the service of the
last pleading directed to the tryable issue of fact. Such a demand
may be endorsed upon a pleading of the party. The rule further
provides that the failure to demand a jury within the time provided in the rule constitutes a waiver by that party for trial by
jury. Due to this rule, it becomes extremely important to determine early in the case whether you are going to demand a jury
or are willing to try the case to the Court.
Various courts vary as to the enforcement of this rule. The
Federal rule is exactly the same and we know of no case where
the Federal Coui t has allowed a jury trial where the parties have
failed to request a jury within the ten-day period. Some of our
State District judges insist upon a strict adherence to the rule
while other District judges will grant a jury trial even though the
demand is not made in accordance with the rules. In order to be
safe, you should be sure to file the request in accordance with the
rules. In this respect, you should remember that if you do request
a jury, you cannot later withdraw such request without the consent of all of the parties. (Rule 38 (d)).
As this article has to do with the selection of the jury, I will
not go into all of the questions involved in determining when to
request a jury. Generally, it is considered that if it is a strict
matter of law then the trial should be to the court. As a general
rule, plaintiffs' attorneys request juries on the theory that the
jury will be more sympathetic to an injured plaintiff than the
court would be, and would also award greater damages. Originally,
this was my feeling, but I have come to the conclusion that oftentimes the trial judge can be even more sympathetic than a jury
and often awards larger damages than a jury. The reason for this
may be that -the judge is dealing with large figures most of the
time and is not as conservative as some jurors. There are, of course,
exceptions to the rule. I have come to the conclusion that in most
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cases, I would rather try a damage suit to a jury than to the court.
In the first place, in the trial to the jury, if the plaintiff fails
to prove his case, then the defendant is entitled to a judgment
of dismissal and he would be entitled to a judgment of dismissal
whether it was to the court or to the jury. In the second place, if
the plaintiff does sustain the burden of proof so as to have the
issues submitted to a jury, then it has been my experience that
generally the juries are not far wrong in determining the issues
of liability and the amount of damages. Here again, there are
always exceptions to the rule.
Having decided to try your case to a jury, the next question
is what type of jurors do you desire. While the theory of selecting
a jury is to obtain a jury that is impartial, and that is what the
attorneys try to obtain, still we cannot lose sight of the fact that
all people have prejudices and no matter how long an examination of a jury is conducted, you are bound to get jurors who may
be swayed one way or the other by reason of their own experiences. Consequently, counsel on both sides of the case are attempting to get jurors as favorable to their side of the case as possible.
Under our Colorado statutes, the number of challenges for
cause is unlimited but each side is limited to four peremptory
challenges. Our Colorado statutes set out certain grounds for
challenges of cause and I am not going into those in this article.
Otherwise than the specified grounds enumerated in the statute
for challenges of cause, the trial court is vested with a sound discretion in ruling upon challenges and unless that discretion is
abused, there is no ground of appeal from the ruling of the court.'
An example of this situation came forcibly to me recently
in a jury trial in the southern part of Colorado. I was defending a damage action under the Guest Statute. Upon interrogating
the jury upon the voir dire examination, I elicited from one of the
women jurors that she had gone to the scene of the accident
about ten minutes after the accident occurred, had examined the
car and had seen the plaintiff before he had been taken to the
hospital. It further developed that she was a second cousin of the
plaintiff but she was very insistent that this would in no way
Kelly vs. People, 121 Colo. 243, 215 Pac. 2nd 336.
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affect her verdict and that she could be fair and impartial in the
matter. Naturally, I challenged this juror for cause. Opposing
counsel resisted the challenge, stating that the prospective juror
had stated unequivocally that this relationship to the plaintiff and
having been at the scene of the accident would in no way affect
her decision in the matter. The trial court, in our opinion, very
correctly held that my challenge for cause was good. It seems to
me that if the court had ruled otherwise, it would certainly have
been an abuse of discretion.
While there are no set rules to be followed in the selection
,of a jury, some attorneys follow a general rule as to class. For
instance, some attorneys feel that in defending a damage suit,
they do not want to have an auditor on the jury as an auditor is
used to dealing with large figures and would be more apt to give
larger damages. Others take the position that a person of Irish
extraction is a dangerous person for the defense as they are generally sympathetic and liberal, whereas, a person of German extraction is inclined to be frugal and would be inclined to hold
down the damages. My own feeling on the question is that generally speaking, I prefer businessmen and women rather than the
laboring class. While it is true that businessmen deal with money,
they know the problems and in my opinion, are much more apt
to be conservative in directing a defendant to pay damages to
another person than the laboring class who oftentimes seem to
enjoy spending other people's money. Women are generally more
conservative than men.
There are several general rules which I follow regarding
jurors. One of these is to find out whether or not the person has
had prior jury service, and if he has had prior jury service, when
and what type of cases he has sat on. It has been my experience
that oftentimes the party that has sat on several juries, particularly if it has been in the same jury term, has got to the point
where he has become somewhat liberal minded and is more apt
to be for the plaintiff than for the defendant.
Another question to be determined is whether you desire
men or women jurors. While, here again, there are always exceptions to the rule, it has been my experience that I have had
better success on the defense with women jurors than with men
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jurors. One of the reasons for this is that while women are generally more sympathetic than men, they also seem to take their
jury duty more seriously and attempt to follow the court's instructions as to the law. Certainly, a defendant cannot ask for
more than to have the jury conscientiously apply the court's instructions to the facts in the case. I certainly want the majority
of women jurors if possible in any case where the plaintiff is a
woman. The old days prior to women jurors in Colorado when
the woman plaintiff could display her charms to the jury are
gone. A woman plaintiff just doesn't get away with that with
women on the jury.
I had that example brought very forcibly to me a few years
ago, although it was in the converse from displaying her charms.
I was defending an assault and battery case brought by a woman
against a storekeeper. The jury consisted of three women and
three men. The plaintiff appeared in court rather shabbily
dressed even though her husband and she owned and operated a
garage, without makeup and made rather a pitiful looking sight.
While the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the verdict
was for only $30.00 which was just $1.00 over and above her
doctor bill. In talking to one of the men jurors after the verdict
had been returned, he advised me that it was fortunate that I had
had some women on the jury. That after the jury went to the
jury room and had determined there was liability, the men wanted
to give substantial damages as they felt sorry for this woman, but
the women jurors pointed out to them that they did not believe
that the woman was badly injured and that she was "putting on"
when she appeared in court as she did; that no woman, however
badly injured, was going to appear in public without attempting
to make herself as attractive as possible.
In questioning the jury on the voir dire examination, I try
to bear in mind that not only am I trying to select a fair and
impartial jury but at the same time am trying to sell my client's
cause to the jury. A trial involves a great deal of salesmanship
and that salesmanship should start as soon as court opens. Consequently, in addressing the jury, I try to let the jury know the
defendant's theory of the case and, of course, try to be very courteous and considerate to the jurors in the examination. Little
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things can often hurt one and certainly an attorney does not want
to have any juror sit in trial of the case who has any resentment
toward the client or the attorney himself. An example of this
was a case where opposing counsel inadvertently addressed a
maiden lady as "Mrs .....--------------" This maiden lady promptly
advised him that she was unmarried but the harm had been done.
You could see that she resented having been referred to as a
married woman, and the attorney was smart enough to exercise
one of his peremptory challenges as to that lady.
In questioning jurors, I believe that you should attempt wherever possible to frame your questions so that you receive either
a simple "yes" or "no" reply. It is quite dangerous to ask jurors
questions that call for an explanatory answer from them. Here
again, let me give you an example. I was defending a malpractice
case against a doctor. The attorney for the plaintiff asked the
general question if any of the jurors had any feeling one way or
the other about a party suing a doctor for malpractice. One juror
raised her hand. The attorney then inquired, "What are your
feelings?" and before counsel or the court could stop the juror,
she gave about a three-minute discourse to the fact that she was
violently opposed to anyone who would go to a doctor for treatment and then after that doctor had done the best that he could,
sue him for damages for alleged malpractice. She gave a wonderful speech for the defense with all the jurors listening to it. This
attorney could have prevented such a discourse if his question
had been, "Do you have any prejudices against a person bringing a
suit for malpractice?" This question would have called for a simple
"'yes" or "no" answer.
I do not want it to be understood that I haven't made mistakes
myself on this type question. Sometime ago in defending a case, I
inquired of the jury if any of them had any personal knowledge of
the accident and one juror raised his hand. I then asked him what
were those facts, and believe me, he proceeded to tell us in no uncertain terms that he had been a witness to the accident, that in his
opinion our client was entirely to blame and that he believed he
should be called as a witness in the case instead of being called as
a juror. I immediately asked for a mistrial but the court in its discretion denied my motion but did sustain my challenge for cause,
but unfortunately, the damage had been done.
When my late partner, William T. 'Wolvington, and I first
started trying cases, we would talk with various jurors after the
termination of the case to attempt to correct our errors both on the
voir dire examination and on the trial itself. We especially did this
in cases which we had lost. We soon decided that such interrogation of the jurors was practically useless. The juror we talked to
was always for us and it was the other jurors that had finally forced
him to vote against our client. We soon decided that we could
discover our errors in other ways.
Regardless of what else you do in the selection of the jury, you
should keep in mind three cardinal points, which are
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1. Always be courteous to the Court, jury and opposing
counsel.
2. Have your questions well in mind before beginning the
voir dire examination.
3. Be as concise and as brief as possible. Jurors are apt to
become hostile if you question them too much.
I appreciate that this article is rambling but as I pointed out in
the beginning, there are no set rules on how to pick a jury and no
matter what any other attorney or I may suggest, the best way to
find out how to select a jury is to do it yourself. It really becomes a
trial and error situation.
While there is a difference of opinion among attorneys on the
point, my own feeling is that the average jury verdict is a one man
verdict. By that, I mean that generally there will be one man or
woman on the jury who has a stronger character or personality
than the other jurors. This party generally becomes foreman and
his ideas and thoughts will greatly influence the jury in its verdict.
This, of course, is not always true and sometimes you get two or
three strong characters on a jury. When I am selecting a jury, I
try to get on that jury at least one person who I feel is somewhat
defense minded and who appears to be a person of strong will and
character. And while this has nothing to do with the selection of
the jury, if I get such a person; on the jury, I always remember that
person during the trial and direct my opening and closing arguments to that juror.
Little things oftentimes influence a juror and while jurors
should not choose sides or try the attorneys rather than the issue
involved, still that sometimes happens. Because of this, an attorney
should watch all of the little things. By little things, I mean such
items as calling the jurors by his or her correct name when addressing them, by showing every courtesy to the juror, by being extremely careful not to ask any questions which may embarrass
the juror in any way. Also, if it is possible, do not take too much
time in exercising your peremptory challenges. Oftentimes, if an
attorney takes a great deal of time pondering over the jury list at
the time of the peremptory challenges, the jurors who are selected
as the jury may get the opinion that that attorney was doubtful as
to some of them and resent this fact. I try to make it a practice
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that by the time I am through questioning the jurors, I have so
marked my jury sheet that I generally know every juror that I
want to strike from the jury. Sometimes that number is more than
the peremptory challenges and then I attempt to very quickly
choose the lesser of the presumed evils.
Probably one of the biggest problems that a defense attorney
has had on the voir dire examination is what to do regarding the
insurance question. By insurance question, we, of course, refer
to the right of the plaintiff's counsel to inquire of the jurors either.
individually or collectively as to their interest in, or connection
with the insurance company that is indirectly involved in the defense of the case. In the case of Rains vs. Rains, 2 our Colorado
Supreme Court approved of this insurance question. In fact, the
Court in that case properly held that an attorney must be allowed
considerable latitude in examining jurors on voir dire so as to
enable him to properly exercise not only challenges for cause but
also peremptory challenges. The Court stated:
"When back of the defendant stands an indemnity company,
actively conducting the defense and having a direct financial
interest in the result-in a sense, a loose sense perhaps, a real
party in interest-justice demands an equally wide latitude in
the examination of jurors on voir dire."
In a still later case, Kath vs. Brodie 3, the trial court sustained
the objection of the defense counsel to a question which read:
"You are familiar with some of the workings of mutual insurance companies, that if the losses become too large the policy
holders may be assessed?"
and the Supreme Court affirmed the action of the lower court holding that while it was proper to inquire as to whether or not a juror
was a policyholder of the insurance company, it was "wholly immaterial what the policy or 'workings' of another mutual insurance
company might be."
It now being the established rule in Colorado that jurors may
be interrogated regarding their interest in an insurance company,
defense counsel have to face the situation and decide in each case
how they want to combat the problem. I have come to the conclu' 97 Colo. 19, 46 Pac. 2nd 741.
.Colo . . .__ 287 Pac. 2nd 957.
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sion that most jurors are attempting to be fair and honest and while
subconsciously they might let the matter influence them in their
verdict, if the matter is put to them in a straightforward way by
defense counsel, they are mord apt to disregard the insurance angle
in arriving at their verdict. In this day of financial responsibility
laws and of widespread advertising in magazines by insurance
companies, it is indeed the exceptional juror who does not know
or realize that the defendant is probably insured.
Because of this, I have taken the position in most of my recent
trials of calling the attention of the jury panel on voir dire that
plaintiff's counsel have inquired regarding insurance and then ask
the jurors how many of them carry insurance on their automobile.
Generally you receive an affirmative answer from all jurors in the
box. The next question to the jurors is, "Would the fact that the
defendant did or did not carry insurance on his automobile make
any difference to you in arriving at your verdict in this case?" I
then ask them if they will arrive at their verdict solely on the evidence introduced in the case and on the law as given to them by
the court, and will they completely disregard the question of insurance. In this way, you put the jury strictly on their honor. In
the cases where I have done this, the results have generally been
satisfactory although you can't expect a perfect "batting average."
Oftentimes in interrogating the jury as indicated above, you can
get across to the jury some of the facts that you want them to be
considering during the trial of the case. A good example of this was
a case being tried before the late Judge Henry Lindsley. It was
an action by a guest against her host in which, of course, she was
alleging negligence consisting of a wilful and wanton disregard of
the rights of others. The wilful and wanton negligence complained
of was the fact that the host driver proceeded through a red signal
light, colliding with a car that was crossing the intersection with
the green light. When interrogating the Jury, I asked the simple
question, "How many of you have sometime during your driving
experience driven through a red signal light?" To my surprise, and
I might state to my gratification, all fourteen jurors in the box
held up their hands and Judge Lindsley smiled and held up his
hand.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once said that "many ideas grow better
when transplanted into another mind than in the one where they
sprung up." And so I trust it will be in this case. Further, this
writer saith not.
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PLEA OF GUILTY AS AN ADMISSION
By WLLIAM E. DoE
William E. Doyle was born in Denver; A.B., University of Colorado; LL.B., George Washington University. Admitted to practice 1938; deputy district attorney 1937-1941; chief deputy
district attorney, 1948-1952; district judge interim term 1948;
instructor in Westminster Law School since 1946; visiting lecturer, University of Colorado Law School, since 1948; has been
in private practice since admitted; in association with John A.
Carroll and Rothgerber, Appel & Powers.
This case note is the result of the comment of E. B. Hamilton of
Durango upon the very terse statements of this author in his cryptic annual review of evidence (Dicta, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, Page 32),
in discussing Ripple v. Brack, C.B.A. Ad. Sh., Vol. VII, Page 446,
1955.
The treatment of the case which received the criticism, reads
as follows:
"In a civil damage action it was error to allow counsel for
Plaintiff to cross-examine the patrol officer concerning the
plea entered by the Defendant in a criminal case tried before
a justice of the peace. Such questions are immaterial in a civil
action and are, of course, highly prejudicial."
The criticism of Mr. Hamilton, which was addressed to the editor of Dicta, is interesting and is worthy of full mention here. Mr.
Hamilton stated:
"We view with some surprise the comment of the Honorable William Doyle to the case above cited. Although the
Court's opinion does not conclusively so indicate, the defendant in this case did plead guilty to a traffic violation. In the
vast majority of the states, such a plea, when made by a party,
is an admission which may properly be admitted into evidence.
"The Court relied on CRS 13-4-140, 'No record of the conviction of any person for any violation of this article shall be
admissible in any court in any civil action. Certainly the plain
meaning of this statute does not interfere with the introduction
of a record of conviction which prejudices a jury by permitting
it to consider the conclusions of some other trier of the facts.
"Regardless of Mr. Doyle's opinion as to what the law
should be, this case, which stands nearly alone in the field of
evidence, and which is one of first impression in Colorado, is
worthy of comment of more than two sentences."
Ordinarily, brevity is a desirable virtue, but it can be, and undoubtedly in this instance was, carried too far. Mr. Hamilton is
correct in his statement that the case is sufficiently interesting to
warrant extended comment. Mr. Hamilton's other criticism is also
well taken. He is quite right in his assertion that as a general rule,
a plea of guilty in a criminal case is admissible as an admission
against the party making it where it is material to the issue which
is being tried.
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There is, however, one other interesting question, and that is
whether the statutory provision, C.R.S. 13-4-140, should be narrowly construed so as to exclude a record of conviction, but at the
same time allowing the introduction of a plea of guilty as an admission.
Although reasonable legal minds could differ on this, my own
viewpoint is that when the legislature declares a policy calling for
the exclusion of convictions, full effect should be given to it, and a
plea of guilty should be held to come within the legislative declaration. There are good reasons for so holding. First, a plea of guilty
is a conviction. Once the plea is received and recorded, the only
thing remaining for the Court to do in order to make this a final
judgment is to pronounce sentence. A taking of evidence is not
a necessary requisite. See C.R.S. 39-7-8 and see also Lacomy v.
People.' The second reason for so construing the statute is that
many people plead guilty to traffic offenses in order to avoid the
trouble and embarrassment of a trial and, therefore, the legislature
could very well recognize that such a plea of guilty has no probative value and this would be more true of a plea of guilty than a
conviction. Consequently, in the light of this reason, there is more
basis for excluding a conviction following a plea of not-guilty.
In the Ripple case, the Plaintiff had apparently tendered a plea
of guilty into evidence although this is not apparent from the record. Insofar as the Court held that the statute applied to convictions based upon pleas of guilty it is believed that the opinion is
correct.
There is one other feature about the decision which is interesting, and that is that neither the plea of guilty nor the record of
conviction were received in evidence and yet the Supreme Court
held that the case should be reversed because of the conduct of
counsel in offering the testimony. It is doubtful whether the prohibition of the statute extends to mere tendering of the evidence,
particularly under the circumstances which are revealed by this
record. The objectionable question was propounded by counsel
for the Plaintiff while examining a patrolman. This, together with
statements of counsel, reads as follows:
"Q. Do you remember when we took your deposition in
Golden, you were going to check and see what plea Mr. Ripple
entered on the charge that you filed against him in the Justice
of Peace Court; did you do that?
"Mr. O'Dell: Just a minute. We object to that.
"Q. He said in his deposition that he would do it. If
that is objectionable, we can get it with another witness.
"Mr. O'Dell: We would like to be heard on that, may it
please the Court.
"Q. If you are going to take up a lot of time, I will get it
somewhere else."
"Q.

Did your investigation show that Mr. Ripple had been

66 Cclo. 19, 178 P. 571.
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on the wrong side of the road?
"A. Yes, Sir.
"Q. You charged him with a traffic violation?
"A. I charged"Mr. O'Dell: Objection. If it please the Court, I think
we had better take this up in the chambers.
"Q. I can still get it from another witness.
"The Court: Are you withdrawing it?
"Q. All right, now you gave some"Mr. O'Dell: If it please the Court, there is still a matter
here I would like to take up in the chambers.
"Q. I will withdraw the question.
"The Court: Then there is nothing before the Court. You
may proceed."
Even if the plea of guilty had been admissible, it would seem
that it should not be introduced in the manner which was employed in this case. The patrolman could not competently testify
to the matter ascertained by the Court record. Furthermore,
whether a traffic charge was filed could not be material under the
circumstances.
Was it incumbent upon the trial court to strike the questions
from the record and instruct the jury to disregard them, and was
its failure to do so, prejudicial error? It is submitted that counsel
for the Plaintiff should have made a motion asking the Court to
instruct the jury to disregard the statements of counsel if he were
to use it as a basis for reversal and the trial judge was not required
to do more than he did.
In the Ripple case, the Supreme Court relied upon the case of
Warren v. Marsh.' In that case, the Plaintiff had pleaded guilty
before a justice of the peace. In the trial of the civil action, the
Plaintiff was asked if he had entered such a plea and the testimony
was admitted over the objection of the Plaintiff. However, later
the trial court granted a motion for new trial based upon his error.
The Defendant elected to appeal this decision. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota affirmed the decision granting a motion for a new
trial. The Minnesota Court said that apart from statute, such an
2-215
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admission would be competent evidence. They further stated,
however, that the legislature had closed the door to this inquiry.
The Minnesota Court reasoned that the statute was undoubtedly
passed because of the fact that pleas of guilty to traffic offenses do
not necessarily mean that the Defendant was guilty. Drivers often
plead guilty, prefering to pay a small fine to becoming involved
in a contested court case. The Minnesota Court also pointed out
that the issues in a civil case are quite different from those which
are present in a criminal case.
Whether the Minnesota Court would have taken the same view
of the matter if, as in the principle case, the question had been
withdrawn, is a matter of speculation. In the Minnesota case, the
objectionable evidence was received and undoubtedly the jury was
influenced by it. However, it would seem to me that this factor
provids a basis for distinguishing the Minnesota decision and that
it is not persuasive authority.
In any event, if there has been a question in the past as to
whether a plea of guilty is a conviction within the meaning of
13-4-140, 1953, CRS, the question has now been resolved, although
the opinion does not clearly reveal, that the matter which was offered in Ripple v. Brack was a plea of guilty. This fact is to be
gleaned from the briefs of counsel in the case. Furthermore, if
there has been some question in the past as to whether the mere
effort on the part of counsel to inject such a matter in the record
constitutes prejudicial error, that question has been also unequivocably answered. The desirability, however, of this latter rule is
open to some question. It would seem that the punishment is
somewhat drastic especially in view of the fact that the complaining party was somewhat less than diligent in making his record
and in his efforts to correct the error.
Whether or not the mere asking of improper questions is to be
considered prejudicial, ought to be left to the trial judge who is in
a better position to evaluate such an effect than a reviewing court.
It is interesting to note that the question of admissibility of a
conviction was again considered by the Court in the recent case
of Brown v. Moyle.:' Here in an automobile case, the Plaintiff introduced, and the Court received copies of an information charging the Defendant with manslaughter and a copy of the verdict
finding him guilty. Here the Court made a distinction between a
conviction and a plea of guilty holding that since, in the Brown
case, the evidence received was that of a conviction and not a plea
of guilty, it constituted prejudicial error. It is interesting to note
also that the statute which was the basis for the Court's action in
Ripple v. Brack, did come into play in Brown v. Moyle. The Court
stated in pertinent part as follows:
"At the trial copies of an information charging Brown with
manslaughter in the killing of Moyle, and a copy of the verdict
finding defendant guilty of manslaughter were admitted over
the objection of defendant. This was error. 4 The Courts are
aVol. ViII, C.B.A. Ad. Sh., No. 4, Page 131, December
431 A.L.R. 261

12, 1955.
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almost unanimous in ruling that such evidence, being evidence
of the conviction of a traffic charge of manslaughter based
on the operation of an automobile in a civil case is inadmissible. It is to be noted that defendant did not plead guilty in
the criminal action."
and then said:
"We believe sufficient has been said to support a reversal
of the judgment herein without a discussion of other errors
that may have some merit.***"
It could be argued that the statute in question excluding convictions, applies to manslaughter which is the result of an automobile accident. However, the Court would not invoke the statute
and it carefully noted that the defendant had not entered a plea of
guilty, thus indicating that a distinction is to be drawn between
a plea of guilty and another type of conviction. The Court's recognition that there may possibly be a distinction, makes the reversal
in Ripple v. Brack all the more questionable because it points up
the fact that the legal question is a close one and that a lawyer
could very easily make a good faith mistake in tendering in evidence a plea of guilty. Needless to say, reversal is too drastic under such circumstances.
It is submitted that matters which are peculiarly related to
the trial of the case, should be left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge, and where, as in Ripple v. Brack, the trial judge did not
find that there was prejudice, it would seem that this should not
be disturbed upon review.
As to the statute, it is this writer's viewpoint that it expresses
a salutary policy and that it should, therefore, be given a broad
construction.
Thanks are expressed to Mr. Hamilton for calling attention
to this problem and assurances are herewith given that in the future, the annual review of evidence task will be performed with
more care.
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OIL AND GAS PROBLEMS AND THE TORRENS SYSTEM
(Many of the recently discovered oil and gas fields in
Colorado are located in the Northeastern part of the State,
which is also the location of the 13th Judicial District.
Furthermore, it is in this area of the State, that the Registration or Torrens System has been most extensively employed. Practitioners and oil men, not to mention Registrars of Title, have encountered a host of problems which,
although not peculiar to oil and gas, were certainly highlighted in the wake of oil and gas discoveries. Many of the
problems arise because of the inflexible nature of the statutory provisions dealing with the Registered Title-passed
many years before the recent oil development.
On May 11, 1956, Judges Francis L. Shallenberger and
Maxwell Snydal, Judges of the 13th Judicial District, called
a conference of members of the 13th Judicial District Bar,
other attorneys, oil and gas men, and interested County Officials at Sterling, Colorado, to discuss and confer on the oil
and gas problems of the Registered Title and recommended
uniform practices and procedures. The following report
contains the highlights of the conference. Also found are
the rules promulgated by the Judges as a result of the conference. It is believed that the material should prove of
interest to the readers of Dicta.-Editor)
1. MINERAL INTERESTS FOR A PERIOD OF YEARS AND AS LONG THEREAFTER AS OIL AND GAS MAY BE PRODUCED FROM THE PREMISES:

It appeared to be the consensus of opinion that such interests
could be most effectively handled by considering the same to be a
reservation or conveyance of a determinable fee; that the Registrar should issue an Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title to the
party vested with such an interest; that the Certificate of Title
should specifically note the date of expiration of the primary term
and that during the primary term, conveyances would be registered and certificates issued as in the case of any other fee interest;
that thereafter, conveyances should be registered and certificates
issued only upon order of Court and after showing that the condition of the interest was still in force.
It will also be necessary to provide for application to the Court
for cancellation of the original certificate and the issuance of another certificate to the holders of the reversionary interest upon
failure of the condition set forth in the original conveyance - that
is, production of oil and gas from the premises.
It was felt that this matter could be handled by Rule of Court
but that legislative action should follow.
2. NOTICE AND PUBLICATION IN SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS:
It was generally felt that publication in applications relating to
lost Certificates of Title and joint tenancy was unnecessary and
should not be required. In other subsequent proceedings where
publication is necessary, either by Statute or order of Court, two
publications, once each week, should be sufficient.
3. REPAIR OF MISTAKES:
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It was felt that when the Registrar discovered a mistake, the
matter should be called to the attention of the Examiner of Titles,
and in cases where the mistake was attributable to the fault of the
Registrar, the expense of the proceedings necessary to correct the
same should be borne by the County.
4. ATTORNEY OF RECORD:
It was the consensus that in all matters requiring action
by the District Court, there should be an attorney of record,
and where an application is filed without the appearance of an attorney, the Court should appoint an attorney at the expense of the
petitioner. This position seems to be supported by 118-10-72, C.R.S.
5. CONVEYANCES

OF LESSEE'S INTEREST:

This problem clearly presented the most confounding issue discussed and there was no uniformity of opinion as to the proper solution. The procedure most favored by the Judges and supported by
many present is as follows:
The original lease should appear as a memorial upon the
Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title; that thereafter, upon presentation to the Registrar of any transfer of the lessee's interest, the
Registrar should require the presentation of a Lessee's Duplicate
Certificate of Title and that all transfers of lessee's interest should
appear as memorials on the Lessee's Duplicate Certificate of Title
and the original Certificate of Title, and that it should not be necessary to require the production of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate
of Title for the registration of such subsequent conveyances. Unquestionably, the adoption of such a Rule as outlined will present
many problems and there is a definite need for legislation on this
problem.
6. COMPLICATED DESCRIPTIONS OR MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATIONS:
It was generally agreed that the Registrars should have authority to refuse to register instruments involving unduly complicated
descriptions of property or mathematical computations of mineral
interests and require the person presenting such instruments for
registration either to simplify the description or submit an accounting of the computation, as the case may require.
7. SUSPENSION FILE:
All were in agreement that the Registrars have no legal authority or obligation to hold for registration instruments presented
without being accompanied by Owner's or Lessee's Duplicate Certicate of Title. As a matter of practice, it was suggested that the
Registrar's who might desire to hold such instruments as an accommodation should notify such persons that the instrument is
being held merely as a matter of accommodation pending receipt of
an Owner's or Lessee's Duplicate Certificate of Title.
8. FEEs:
It was apparent that there does not now exist any uniformity
insofar as docket fees are concerned in supplemental matters. It
was called to our attention that the fees provided by Statute for
civil actions should apply in proceedings before the Court. These
Statutes provide for a plaintiff's docket fee of $10.00, and for a
docket fee of $5.00 on interpleading. It is the feeling of the Judges
that the petitioner on supplemental proceedings can logically be
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considered as interpleading in the original action, in which event
the proper fee would be $5.00.
So far as Registrars are concerned, it was felt that the provisions of 118-10-86, C.R.S., should be called to their attention. This
section provides for the assessment of a fee for the Indemnity Fund
on subsequent transfers of the property to heirs and devisees. It is
doubted if this fee is now regularly being collected by all of the
Registrars.
9.

PLACE FOR RESERVATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS:

It was felt that reservations or exceptions or conditions in any
conveyance should appear in or following the description of the
property on the original and duplicate certificates, and that the
Registrars should show there the document number of the instruments wherein the reservation or exception is set up.
10. CERTIFICATE OF PAID Up TAXES:

It was generally felt that no good purpose was served by requiring a Certificate of Paid Up Takes more than once in any one
year. This is a matter that will have to be taken care of by legislation.

RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO REGISTRARS
STATE OF COLORADO

1

ss.

COUNTY OF LOGAN
RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO REGISTRARS OF TITLE AND
CLERKS OF COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT.

Pursuant to the terms and provisions of 118-10-9, C.R.S.-'53, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED by the Judges of the Thirteenth Judicial District of the State of Colorado, sitting en banc at
Sterling, Colorado, that the following rules and instructions shall be
applicable in the offices of the Registrars of Title and in the District
Courts within the Thirteenth Judicial District, from and after this
date and until the further order of the Court:
1. Upon presentation to the Registrar of Titles of an instrument conveying or reserving a mineral interest for a definite period
of years and as long thereafter as oil and gas may be produced from
the premises, the Registrar shall issue to the grantee of such an interest, or the person reserving such an interest, an Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title, and such an interest shall be considered
a fee interest. The original Certificate of Title and copies thereof
shall specifically note thereon the date of expiration of the primary
term. During the primary term, subsequent conveyances shall be
registered and certificates issued as in the case of other fee interests. After such date, conveyances shall be registered and certificates issued only upon order of Court, and Certificates of Title shall
be cancelled upon the failure of the condition in the conveyance
only upon order of Court.
2. Upon discovery of a mistake in a Certificate of Title, the
Registrar of Titles shall call the same to the attention of the Examiner of Titles, and in cases where the mistake shall be attributable
to the fault of the Registrar, the expense of such proceeding as may
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considered as interpleading in the original action, in which event
the proper fee would be $5.00.
So far as Registrars are concerned, it was felt that the provisions of 118-10-86, C.R.S., should be called to their attention. This
section provides for the assessment of a fee for the Indemnity Fund
on subsequent transfers of the property to heirs and devisees. It is
doubted if this fee is now regularly being collected by all of the
Registrars.
9.

PLACE FOR RESERVATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS:

It was felt that reservations or exceptions or conditions in any
conveyance should appear in or following the description of the
property on the original and duplicate certificates, and that the
Registrars should show there the document number of the instruments wherein the reservation or exception is set up.
10. CERTIFICATE OF PAID Up TAXES:

It was generally felt that no good purpose was served by requiring a Certificate of Paid Up Takes more than once in any one
year. This is a matter that will have to be taken care of by legislation.

RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO REGISTRARS
STATE OF COLORADO
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COUNTY OF LOGAN
RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO REGISTRARS OF TITLE AND
CLERKS OF COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT.

Pursuant to the terms and provisions of 118-10-9, C.R.S.-'53, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED by the Judges of the Thirteenth Judicial District of the State of Colorado, sitting en banc at
Sterling, Colorado, that the following rules and instructions shall be
applicable in the offices of the Registrars of Title and in the District
Courts within the Thirteenth Judicial District, from and after this
date and until the further order of the Court:
1. Upon presentation to the Registrar of Titles of an instrument conveying or reserving a mineral interest for a definite period
of years and as long thereafter as oil and gas may be produced from
the premises, the Registrar shall issue to the grantee of such an interest, or the person reserving such an interest, an Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title, and such an interest shall be considered
a fee interest. The original Certificate of Title and copies thereof
shall specifically note thereon the date of expiration of the primary
term. During the primary term, subsequent conveyances shall be
registered and certificates issued as in the case of other fee interests. After such date, conveyances shall be registered and certificates issued only upon order of Court, and Certificates of Title shall
be cancelled upon the failure of the condition in the conveyance
only upon order of Court.
2. Upon discovery of a mistake in a Certificate of Title, the
Registrar of Titles shall call the same to the attention of the Examiner of Titles, and in cases where the mistake shall be attributable
to the fault of the Registrar, the expense of such proceeding as may
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be necessary to correct the same shall be borne by the County.
3. Upon presentation to the Registrar of Titles of an oil and gas
lease, the Registrar of Titles shall require the presentation of the
Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title and the lease shall be noted
thereon as a memorial. Thereafter, upon the presentation to the
Registrar of any conveyance or assignment of the lessee's interest
under the terms and provisions of such lease, the Registrar shall
require the presentation of a Lessee's Duplicate Certificate of Title,
and that all such conveyances of lessee's interest shall appear as
memorials on the Lessee's Duplicate Certificate of Title and upon
the original Certificate of Title, and it shall not be necessary to require the production of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title
for the registration of said subsequent conveyances of lessee's interest.
4. In their discretion, Registrars of Title are authorized and
empowered to refuse to register instruments submitted to them
which involve unduly complicated descriptions of property or
mathematical computations of mineral interest until such time as
the person submitting such an instrument shall either simplify the
description or submit an accounting of the computation of mineral
interest, as the case may require.
5. Attention of the Registrars of Title is called to the fact that
the law makes no provision for the holding for registration of instruments presented without being accompanied by either an
Owner's Duplicate or a Lessee's Duplicate Certificate of Title.
6. Attention of the Registrars of Title is called to the provisions
of 118-10-86, C.R.S.-'53, which section provides for the assessment
of a fee for the use of the Indemnity Fund on subsequent transfers
of property to heirs and devisees.
7. Exceptions or reservations or conditions contained in instruments conveying or assigning mineral interests shall appear on the
Certificates of Title, either in the description of the property or immediately following the description, and there shall be noted therein the document number of the instrument wherein the exception,
reservation or condition is established.
8. From and after this date, in subsequent proceedings under
the Torrens Act, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, publication
of notice shall not be required in applications for the issuance of
lost certificates of title or the issuance of a new certificate of title
under a joint tenancy certificate. In other subsequent proceedings
where publication is necessary, either by statute or order of Court,
two publications shall be sufficient; that is to say, said notice shall
be published once in each of two succeeding weeks.
9. In all subsequent proceedings before the District Court, there
shall be an attorney of record and in cases where an application is
filed without the appearance of an attorney, the Court shall appoint
an attorney at the expense of the petitioner.
10. In all subsequent proceedings in the District Court, the
Clerks of the District Courts within the Thirteenth Judicial District
shall charge a docket fee of Five ($5.00) Dollars for each party
appearing.
Done at Sterling, Colorado, this 1st day of June, A. D. 1956.
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RECENT ACTION IN THE NO-MAN'S
LAND OF LABOR LAW
By

WALTER L. GERASH

Walter L. Gerash received his
A.B., Univ. of California, 1949;
A.M., Univ. of Chicago, 1951;
L.B., Univ. of Denver, June, 1956.
The following article was written
while Mr. Gerash was a student at
the University of Denver.

The purposes of this article are three-fold: 1) to discuss briefly
the general doctrine of federal pre-emption; 2) to point out some
of the exceptions to the doctrine; and 3) to discuss extensively the
leading state agency and court decisions when the NLRB under its
new jurisdictional standards refuses or actually declines to exercise
its jurisdiction. In short the question posed is: "What have the
various states done when this vacuum or no man's land is created?"'
THE DIKE OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION

Since John Marshall said in 1824 that commerce was "intercourse" the Commerce Clause has been expanded to embrace a multitude of things that Congress can regulate. 2 From the wages of
a window washer who washed windows once a week to an automobile plant,3 to the wheat grown by a single farmer for his own con1Following is a list of articles published in the Labor Law Journal concerning the subject and
the many ramifications therein: Arthur K. Gorfinkel 'Conflict Between Federal and State Jurisdiction"
(December 1951) P. 1007; Keith Lorenz "Conflict of Jurisdiction Between 'he National and State
Labor Relations Boards" (December 1951) p. 887; Editors "Federal-State Relations in Labor Law"
(March 1950) p. 419; Jay E. Shonklin "How NLRB Has Applied Its Jurisdictional Standards" (June
1951) p. 391; Phillip Feldblum "Jurisdictional 'Tidelands' in Labor Relations" (February 1952) p.
114; Edward L. Schwartz "Local Business-No Man's Land in Labor Relations" (December 1949) p.
189; Mozart G. Rotner, "Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations" (November
1952) p. 350; Wilbur L. Pollard, "Federal Labor Low Administrative Recession" (December 1955)
p. 863; R. H. Roche Jr. and K. L. Hanslowe, "NLRB Absolutism-A Dogma Revisited" (May 1955)
p. 279; Fred Witney, "NLRB Jurisdictional Policies and the Federal-State Relationship" (January
1955) p. 3; Walter L. Daykin, "NLRB Jurisdictional Standards I" (September 1955) p. 617; Walter
L. Daykin, "NLRB Jurisdictional Stanards I1" (October 1955) p. 696.
See also Proceeding of New York University, Fifth Annual Conference On Labor, Emanuel
Stein, editor (New York: Mathew Bender and Co., Inc., 1952) pp. 1, 77, 119; First Annual Conference p. 463; Second Annual Conference, p. 505; Third Annual Conference, p. 277; Seventh Annual
Conference p. 1 and Eighth Annual Conference, p. 1.
The law review articles are many but several leading ones are: Archibald Cox and Marshall
J. Seidman, "Federalism and Labor Relations," 64 Harvard Law Review, p. 1297 (June 1950);
LaeI S. De Muth, "Federal State Jurisdlction-A Pre-emption Question," 27 Rocky Mountain Law
Review, p. 330 (April 1955); Austin F. Shute, "State Versus Federal Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes;
The Garner Case," 19 Missouri Law Review, p. 110 (April 1954); George Roumell and Peter Schlesinger,
"The Preemption Dilema In Labor Relations," 18 University of Detroit Law Journal (December 1954),
January 1955 pp, -17, 135.
2Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
SMartino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co. 10 Labor Cases No. 51220. 327-U.S. 173 (1946).
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sumption; 4these constitute parts of this vast expanse of Federal
regulation.
In the field of labor relations the National Labor Relations Act
(hereafter referred to as NLRA) was passed on the theory that a
promulgation and protection of collective bargaining would reduce
the irritants to the flow of commerce. The act was declared constitutional because a strike at the point of production in a large interstate industry would have an "immediate and . . . catastrophic"

effect on commerce5 The Act was "to diminish the causes of labor
disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce,
to create a national labor relations board and for other purposes.";
Likewise the purpose of the LMRA was

"...

for the mediation of

labor disputes affecting commerce ... "I
The pre-empting character of the Wagner Act was conclusively
proclaimed in 1945 when the U. S. Supreme Court struck down a
state labor law regulating union business agents." However, it was
not until the Bethlehem Case that the Supreme Court proclaimed
its views on the various jurisdictional problems.'
With the cornerstone of the Bethlehem decision laid, a host of
Supreme Court cases followed, forming the foundation of the dike
of Federal pre-emption. Thus wherever the NLRA and Taft-Hartley Act apply, the entire field of labor relations is pre-empted to the
Federal government. 10
Wickard v. Filburn, 63 S. Ct. 82, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
3National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 1 Labor Cases No. 17017, 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
6 Act of July 5. 1935 c. 772, 49 State 449. 29 U.S. Code Sec. 151 ff (the preamble).
Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, 61 Stat. 136, Title II, 29 U.S. Code Sec. 171 ff. (the preamble).
8Hill v. Florida, 9 Labor Cases § 51208, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
"Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. New York State Labor Relations Board and Allegheny Ludlum
Steel Corp. v. Kelley, 12 Labor Cases 51245, 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
Foremen in the two companies
filed a petition with the NLRB for certification of a bargaining unit for the foremen. This petition
was denied, the NLRB refused to take jurisdiction. Then the foremen filed a petition with the New
York State Labor Relations Board, which granted it. The companies sought an injunction in the
New York State Court to restrain the State Board from enforcing its order. The highest New York
court affirmed the order. U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that exclusion by the Wagner
Act must be implied from the nature of the legislation in absence of an express provision; that
state laws were invalid when Federal laws governed the same subject matter even though the
specific part covered by the state law was not as yet dealt with by the Federal agency set up
by the Federal law. The Court also held that a refusal to entertain jurisdiction was not an implied
granting or ceding of the power to the states. The Court felt that due to the need of uniformity
of regulation of a national problem on a national level it would be dangerous to allow a case
by case test of Federal supremacy..
Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion felt that a doctrinaire application of the majority
opinion to exclude all State activity would create a vacuum due to the immensity of the task and
the Federal budgetary limitations.
30In the fieldof representation elections: La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment
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SOME WELL-KNOwN HOLES IN THE DIKE

There are several well-known exceptions to the rule of Federal pre-emption," two of which are to be found in the Taft-Hartley
Act. Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act permits the states to
regulate the law of union security agreements. Thus, although the
Taft-Hartley Act allows the union shop in section 8(a) (3), state
law can supersede Federal law in this regard. Eighteen states
have outlawed or restricted union shops.
The other exception in the Taft-Hartley Act is section 10(a)
Relations Board, 16 Labor Cases § 64913, 336 U.S. 18 (1949); Strike vote procedure: International
Union of United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Imperent Workers v. O'Brien, 18 Labor
Cases § 6,5,761, 339 U.S. 454 (1950): state public utility law for compulsory arbitration: Amalgamated
Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 19 Labor Cases § 66,193, 340 U.S. 383 (1951); strike in breach of contract: Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, 27 Labor Cases § 69,064; stranger picketing: Garner v. Teamsters 24 Labor Cases
§ 68,020, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
For further analysis see Harry Brady, "Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age In Labor Relations"
5 Labor Low Journal 743 (November 1954).
In the above Garner case the court held that where a state acts under its anti-trust law,
the controlling Federal power must be resorted to, even though the ground of intervention on part
of the state is different than that on which Federal supremacy has been exercised.
Recently the Supreme Court voided a state court order based on a common low action since
it would be enforcing an unfair labor practise outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act. General Drivers,
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 89 et al. v. American Tobacco Co. Inc., 27 Labor Cases
69,082, 348 U.S. 962 (1955).
Federal courts are not allowed to enjo'n an unfair labor practice on the motion of private
parties-only the NLRB can do so. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. & NLRB v. Textile Workers Union 14
Lobar Cases 64,443; 167 Fed. (2d) 183 (1948; I. L. W. U. Local 6, C.I.O. v. Sunset Line and
Twine Co., D.C., N.D. Calif. 14 Labor Cases 64,444, 77 F. Supp. 119 (1948).
The principln of the exhaustion of administrative remedies must be adhered to not only in the
Federal Courts but in the state tribunals as well. See Costaro v. Simons 19 Labor Cases 66,295,
302 N.Y. 318, 198 N.E. (2d) 454 (1951).
Versus State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations," Proceeding of
1 William Isaacson, "Federal
New York University, Eighth Annual Conference on Labor (New York, 1955) p. 1.
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allowing the NLRB to cede jurisdiction of its cases to any state
agency, even though such cases may affect interstate commerce.
However, the scope of section 10(a) is restricted by a further
clause which holds that state law must be consistent with a corresponding provision of the Federal law and must have received
a similar construction as the Federal law.
A third exception to the doctrine of Federal pre-emption is
where the economic facts show that there is no effect on interstate commerce. However, the effect on interstate commerce can
embrace a multitude of areas and acts not on their face interstate
commerce. Thus, this exception is not only nebulous, but is most
elastic as well.
A fourth exception is based on the police power of the states.
This authority is exercised where there is an imminent threat or
actual breach of the peace,
as in mass picketing, 12 sit-down strikes, 13
14
and "quicky" strikes.

A fifth and15 recent exception is the allowance of damage suits

in state courts.

.Allen
Bradley v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 5 Labor Cases J 51,135; 315
U.S. 740 (1942).
'5 N.L.R.B. v. Fonsteel Metallurgical Corp., 1 Labor Cases § 17,042; 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
4 U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 16 Labor Cases § 64,992; 336 U.S. 245
(1949).
'9 United Construction Workers v. Laburnam
Construction Corp., 26 Labor Cases § 68,460; 347
U.S. 656 (1953).
Union agents threatened the employees with violence to force them to join the union. Because
of these circumstances, the employer abandoned his construction work and then sued for the resulting damages. Although the acts were an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8 of the
N L.R.B., the question arose as to whether the N.L.R.B. had exclusive jurisdiction over the subect
matter, so as

to pre-empt

the

state court in

hearing

an action based

on

common

low tort.
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The sixth exception is at present unresolved by the Supreme
Court and can be stated in the form of a question: what can the
states do when the NLRB declines to exercise its pre-emptive jurisdiction because of its self-imposed "yardstick" standards? This
"no-man's land" or "vacuum" is called such because it is a situation
where the states have no jurisdiction, yet the NLRB refuses to
take jurisdiction.'"
STATE DECISIONS REFUSING JURISDICTION

At the outset it should be recognized that even within some
states there are conflicting decisions as to whether a state does
have jurisdiction when the NLRB declines. When the NLRB declines to exercise its jurisdiction based on its yardstick minima,
Congress did not intend that this would re-invest the state courts
with jurisdiction. Thus far, the most cogently reasoned decision
following this position is a Michigan Circuit Court ruling 17 where
a retail automobile dealer petitioned for an injunction to restrain
a union from picketing in violation of a state statute and the TaftHartley Act. At the outset, the Court recognized that the question
of whether a state court has jurisdiction has not been resolved by
the highest court of the land.
Judge Searle in a brilliant opinion presented his analysis by
answering three questions. The first was what has the U.S. Supreme Court held in regard to the effect of the NLRA and the TaftHartley Act upon the power of the state and its courts? The Court
then reviewed four leading decisions. In Bethlehem Steel' it was
concluded that if there are two administrative bodies dealing with
the same subject matter, the NLRB displaced the state Board.
The Court quoted Justice Jackson in Bethlehem saying "it has
long been the rule that exclusion of state action may be implied
from the nature of the legislation and the subject matter, although
express declaration of such a result is wanting."
In the LaCross Case, Judge Searle pointed out, that the Wisconsin Board was Without authority to certify the employees' bargaining representative in an industry engaged in interstate commerce--the court holding that a case by case test of supremacy
which would allow the state to act until the Federal Board has
acted is not permissible.'"
In the Garner Case, it was pointed out that the Supreme Court
affirmed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when it held that a
lower court was without jurisdiction to entertain a motion to enjoin picketing which was in violation of state and federal law.-"
court allowed the action on the basis that under the Wagner Act, there was no protection against
such union conduct, and since Taft-Hartley increased the responsibility of the unions (e.g. section 8 b)
the right to proceed in the state forum would not be denied. The rest of the reasoning that allowed
a by-pass of the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. was very weak.
'6 See Roche and Hanslow, "NLRB Absolutism-A Dogma Revisited," 6 Labor Low Journal 279.
This article concerns the political considerations underlying the Board's new standards. The article
also challenges the basic power of the Board to decline its jurisdiction. It also points out that
the Board's jurisdictional policies are discretionary and hence, subject to judicial review. The
author seems to agree with Board-member Murdock, that the new standards are not based on
practical consideratons, but are a subversion of Congressional policy
"7 Universal Car Co. v. Association of Machinists, 27 Labor Cases § 68,825; Mich., 1954 Cir.
Ct. Kent Co.
iSee footnote 9.
"See footnote 10.
20See footnote 10.
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A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedure was frowned
upon.
Finally in the Kinard Case, the Supreme Court reversed the
Alabama Supreme Court, which held that the employer was entitled to have unions enjoined from picketing. 1 I The Court held
that there was no clear showing that the employer applied to the
NLRB for appropriate relief or that it would be futile to do so.
The Court then pointed out that it realized a no-man's land existed
by saying, ". . . the Court does not pass upon the question suggested by the opinion below of whether the State Supreme Court
could grant its own relief should the Board decline to exercise its
own jurisdiction."
The second question presented in the Michigan decision was,
"What has the Board done or decided in and by the announcement of its 'standards' for the exercise or refusal to exercise jurisdiction?" Quoting the Board itself, from its sixteenth and seventeenth Annual Report together with the holding of the Star Beef
case ,'2 the court held that the question of the extent to which the
Board may be bound by its own prior policy decision not to take
jurisdiction over a certain industry is conclusive. The Board is not
precluded from asserting jurisdiction over an employer because
it previously has declined to process cases involving similarly
situated employers. The Board has jurisdiction all the time, according to the court's holding.
- Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 24 Labor Cases
(1954).
= NLRB v. Star Beef Co., 20 Labor Cases § 66.681; 193 F. 2d B (1951).

§ 68,086; 346 U.S. 933
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The court went on to discuss the new "yardstick" standards
of July, 1954, and concluded that these standards do not deprive
the Board of jurisdiction, but merely indicate policy reasons why
it will not exercise the jurisdiction which it does have under the
law. Under the facts of the Universal case, supra, the NLRB in
the past did exercise jurisdiction in automobile agency fields and
the Supreme Court had sustained its jurisdiction. In essence,
Congress had taken frcm the state's agencies and courts such jurisdiction in automobile agency fields and the Supreme Court had
sustained its jurisdiction. In essence, Congress had taken from
the state's agencies and courts such jurisdiction. The mere fact
that the Board refuses to exercise its jurisdiction now does not
re-invest the states and the courts with jurisdiction which they
did not have, as long as the Board chooses ultimately to exercise
the jurisdiction given it by Congress.
The third and final question was that of whether state courts
have any jurisdiction when the NLRB refuses to exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of its yardstick standards? The court approved the reasoning of the Wags case, which will be discussed
below. 2 :

It pointed to the language of the Taft-Hartley Act under

section 10(a), as the only intention of Congress to set aside remedies for the State. The argument that Congress intended that the
states should act in cases where the void exists is weak, for Congress did not remain silent-witness section 10a. Just because
Congress created the void due to its agency refusing jurisdiction,
the effect cannot be the legislating back to the states the jurisdiction taken from them-this can only be done by section 10a,
which was so specified.
The Court concluded that if the jurisdiction of the state courts
is to depend not upon the act of Congress and the actual jurisdiction of the NLRB, but upon the month to month or day to day
discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by the Board, which depends
upon changing budgetary conditions or upon its economic, social
or political views as of the moment, then neither the courts nor
the litigants can ever know with any certainty where jurisdiction
lies. Neither will the litigants know whether in a given case,
jurisdiction existing at the time of its commencement will continue through the trial, on appeal, or until settled by the highest
court. As applied to the specific facts of the case, if the Supreme
Court were to agree that the state courts have jurisdiction in those
cases where the NLRB refuses to act, the Court would follow its
position as it stated in Kinard.-4 In this decision, the Court held
that the Michigan court was without jurisdiction since there was
an absence of an actual refusal to act by the NLRB.
A New York appellate court has held that the state court was
without jurisdiction and that the NLRB had jurisdiction even
where it had failed to exercise such jurisdiction. It commented:
"where the field of labor relations is occupied by the Federal Act
the State may not furrow. Accordingly, it follows that Federal

-

New York State Labor Relations Board v.
68,754; 130 N.Y. 2d 731 (1954)
2"See footnote 21.

Wags Transportation System,

26 Labor Cases

§
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jurisdiction is not dependent upon whether the NLRB acts or
declines to act in the premises

. . .,,25

The dissent in the Wags case argued that it is better to have
any action at the local level, rather than a "no-man's land" in
which neither Federal nor local boards could or would act.
A Connecticut court has held that the state Board of Labor
Relations does not have jurisdiction over an employer engaged in
the building material business.2" Its reasons were not exactly in
point with the Michigan case, since it based its rationale on the
fact that the NLRB had not declined to exercise its jurisdiction
over the employer as yet. It also noted that the employer's purchases from outside the state during the year immediately preceeding the hearing were in excess of the NLRB's minimum yardstick requirements for assertion of jurisdiction. Therefore, the employer was subject to the NLRA and not subject to the Connecticut
Act. While this case is not directly in point, it recognizes displacement of the state jurisdiction by Federal jurisdiction before any
self-limiting action on the part of the NLRB. However, it does
imply that the court might have held differently had the jurisdictional minima of the NLRB not been met.
STATE DECISIONS TAKING JURISDICTION

The Universal case represents the strongest position of the decisions of states not to take jurisdiction when the NLRB refuses
to assert its jurisdiction because of its self-inflicted standards.
There is a more recent Michigan case from the same judicial
level,
27
but from another county, that has taken the contrary view.
A general contractor had a contract with the several picketing
unions. The plumbing and electrical contractors had contracts
with a rival union. The Circuit Court held that the lower court
had jurisdiction to enjoin the unions from picketing the construction job. This ruling was handed down, even though the NLRB
would have jurisdiction of the matter, but for its 'jurisdictional
standards. The union's motion to dismiss on a plea to the jurisdiction was denied. This Michigan state court concluded that since
there was no direct inflow of goods or materials from out of the
2 See footnote 23.
' Norwich Lumber Co. v. Teamsters (Conn.) SLRB Decision No. 336 July 26, 1955, 1 29,322.
School District of City of Holland et al. v. Trades Council, Michigan Circuit Court, Ottowo
County, § 48781/2, Nov. 20, 1955. 37 L.R.R.M. 2232.
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state valued at one-half million dollars per year, the 2NLRB's jurisdictional standards of section 7 had not been met. " The court
stated that, "For the purposes of this decision the court will assume
that the NLRB would refuse to act in the dispute which is the
subject of the litigation."
Another recent decision by the Michigan State Labor Mediation Board took a similar position .2 It held that since the NLRB
declined to take jurisdiction the employer and employees had
nowhere to go for its representation election. The Michigan Board
said, "The Board is strongly of the opinion that where a delegation
of authority is not acted upon by the Federal Government such
authority should revert to the state."
In this discussion, there are actually two questions before
the courts: 1) May state boards and courts take jurisdiction if the
NLRB does nothing and it appears that the jurisdictional minima
have not been met; and 2) May the state boards and courts take
jurisdiction when the NLRB does act, refusing to take jurisdiction
because of its invoking of the yardsticks?
In a New Jersey case, an injunction was issued to restrain
picketing, since the object was to destroy the employer's business
and not to organize the employees. Also, there were violations of
a temporary restraining order. In this case, the employer first petitioned the NLRB to exercise its jurisdiction in the matter; and the
Board and the General Counsel declined to exercise their discretion.8 0
The Court held that the Taft-Hartley Act does not deprive the
court of jurisdiction since the NLRB did not act when so petitioned.
Arguing a similar policy position as in the previous case, the court
refused to have any "jurisdictional paralysis" set in and stated
that "the genius" of Federalism can prevent such paralysis.
A Texas case seems much in accord wich the Michigan School
District case,"' when " it took judicial notice of the NLRB's jurisdictional yardsticks2 Here the court took over jurisdiction and
applied the state law, since under the NLRB's standards the Board
would "probably" decline jurisdiction over the employer. The
union, here, was picketing to compel the employer to recognize it
as the bargaining agent for its drivers. The court approved a temporary injunction against picketing, since it appeared that the union
did not represent a majority, and also, since there was violence.
The union argued that the court did not have jurisdiction and
that there was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
the NLRB. They argued that appellee did not allege or show that it
sought relief before the NLRB or that the NLRB would not assert
or exercise its jurisdiction if invoked.
In what appears to be the only state supreme court decision
dealing with the topic thus far, answers to both of the above ques1615.85.
29 Federal Dairy Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 638 (No. 107) (1950). J 1615; 1615.15;
Board
29 In re Teamsters Local 376, AFL and Walker Motors, Inc. (Michigan Labor Mediation
49,318).
§
1955;
7,
July
Decision
68,938;
§
Cases
Labor
27
Co.,
o Hammer v. Textile Workers, New Jersey 1945 Sup. Ct. Hudson
111 A. (2d) 308.
s1See footnote 27.
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tions are given.:: It should be noted at the outset that the decision
was a four-to-three split, with both sides presenting the basic conflict that has been indicated in the decisions already discussed. In
the Garmon case, the California Court answered question one
above in the negative and question two in the affirmative. The
court held that the picketing of an employer doing interstate business, even though a violation of the Federal Taft-Hartley Act, may
be enjoined where the NLRB has previously refused to assert its
jurisdiction of a representation proceeding involving the employer.
In the companion case, Benton,:" the court held that where there
was no actual refusal by the NLRB to assert jurisdiction, the state
courts do not have jurisdiction even though the employer's business
does not meet the minimum jurisdictional standards established
by the NLRB.
There were two picketing unions that were not certified in
the Garmon case. Both unions wanted a closed shop." The company refused to execute the contract believing it to be a violation
of the NLRA, since no election was held as yet. The NLRB refused
to take jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether the
defendants should be designated as the collective bargaining representatives of the employees of the plaintiff. A judgment was
entered against defendants for damages and an injunction was
issued.
The union's position was that the jurisdiction rests exclusively
with the NLRB, that the company did not exhaust its administrative remedies, that the evidence did not support the findings, that
the findings did not include all the issues tendered, and that the
record shows no violation of any state law.
The Court held that thus far Congress had not prohibited the
states from assuming jurisdiction of conduct which would be an
unfair labor practice under the Federal law when the NLRB refused to take jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the NLRB's
initial refusal to take a representation election was based on the
fact that the jurisdictional requirements were not met. Also, to
meet the union's arguments of not exhausting administrative remese Drivers Union v. Jax Beer Co., Texas Ct. of Civil Appeals F;fth Supreme Judicial District §
14949 (1955).
IaGarmon v. Building Trades Council, 29 Labor Cases § 69642, 291 P. (2d), 1 (1956).
:t. Benton, Inc. v. Pointers Local 333, 29 Labor Cases § 69643, 291 P. (2d) 13 (1956).
Park and Tilford v. leamsters, 10 Labor Cases § 62,963; 27 Cal. (2d) 599 (1946).
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dies, the Court said that since the initial rejection of the petition
was based on yardstick grounds, it would be futile to get a review
of the Regional Director's action. Also, the fear of the "vacuum"
was argued. Thus, if the states are powerless after the NLRB
refuses jurisdiction, one of the parties can flout the policy expressed by Congress in national legislation.
Finally, at the same time that the court affirmed the state
court's jurisdiction, it held that, although union pressure for a
closed shop is legal in California, nevertheless, via the Taft-Hartley
Act, section 8 (b) (2), it is an unfair labor practice and not privileged under California law.
In a vigorous dissent based on a four-fold analysis, Justice
Carter argued that:
1. Federal law is to be administered by the NLRB, not by
the state courts;
2. The Board, in refusing jurisdiction, held in effect, that
Federal law should not apply in this case;
3. It is neither feasible nor fair to apply Federal law;
4. There has been no such refusal to exercise jurisdiction
by the Board as to justify the conclusion that the state
court has jurisdiction.
Under point one, the dissent quoted from Garner 7 in order to
show that the NLRB was the proper forum. Under point two,
Justice Carter showed that the Board can properly decline to act,
holding at the same time that the policies of the act would not be
effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction in that case. By declining
jurisdiction, the NLRB does so due to the fact that the policies of
the act would not be effectuated by the Board's assertion of jurisdiction." Thus it follows that the state court should not apply
the Federal act where the Board refused to act.
Under point three, the dissent pointed out that in California
there was no state board to conduct elections, and thus, the decision results in discrimination. The state law should apply since
the NLRB refused jurisdiction. There was also a question as to
whether the NLRB actually and finally refused to take jurisdiction. Also, the administrative remedies were not exhausted,
since the employer did not appeal to Washington, thus leaving no
final determination in regard to the jurisdiction.
Finally, the dissent pointed out that there was an assumption
that the refusal to take jurisdiction of the case was ground for the
state court to take jurisdiction. This had not been ruled upon by
the U.S. Supreme Court. Also, there was not sufficient showing of
refusal to exercise jurisdiction, since the Board said no action
would be taken "at this time"; thus implying that a change of
conditions might bring about a different result or that the charge
of an unfair labor practice (which the majority of the California
Court found) would result in a NLRB action.
In a companion case, decided that same day by the California
Court, the general rule of Garmon was affirmed." However, the
"' See

footnote 10.

- NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 19 Labor Cases § 66,347; 341 U.S.
675, 684 (1951).
• See footnote 3.5.
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court also recognized that where there was no refusal (merely inaction) on the part of the NLRB to take the case on jurisdictional
grounds, the state court does not have jurisdiction in such a case.
Hence, merely because the amount of the employer's business does
not meet the minimum requirements of the NLRB's yardsticks,
this does not automatically confer jurisdiction on the state court.
While the case does affirm Garmon, it does run counter to the
cases that we have discussed which held that the courts may assume that the NLRB won't act because the jurisdictional minima
have not been met.
In New York, there are two recent decisions that follow this
"assuming" position that was expressly rejected by the California
Court. In one case, the company's business was deemed predominantly local by the state board and thus held that the NLRB did
not have exclusive jurisdiction. 40 Also, procedurally, the company
did not raise it before the N.Y. Board made its order against it.
The court also distinguished the situation from the Wags case,'
where there was no proof that the NLRB would have declined to
assume jurisdiction at the time the Wags proceedings were instituted. The N.Y.L.B. then found evidence that the employer was
guilty of unfair labor practice as defined by state law.
In the other New York case, the court approved the state
board's action of taking jurisdiction whether or not the amount of
business met the NLRB's yardsticks. 42 The employer contended
that the N.Y.L.B. was without jurisdictional standards of the
NLRB. The employer further contended that it is not for the state
board or courts to invoke these yardsticks, but for the NLRB.
Briefly, the Court held:
Where the National Board refuses to assert jurisdiction
labor disputes must be subject to regulation by the states
or they will not be regulated at all. Labor disputes may or
may not substantially affect interstate commerce, but they
invariably have an immediate and direct impact upon the
local community in which they occur. We do not believe
that Congress, which granted the National Board discretionary power to decline jurisdiction, ever intended to prevent the states when that occurs, from taking necessary
steps to protect their own safety, health, and welfare.
In a recent decision of the Michigan State Labor Mediation
Board it was held that since the NLRB actually declined to take
jurisdiction, it left the employers and the employees nowhere to
go regarding their representation election. Thus the Board concluded that Michigan law should govern the authority,

"...

should

revert to the state."43
In Wisconsin, it was held that the state labor board was not
precluded from taking jurisdiction in a representation proceeding over two lumber companies, the volume of business of which
O New York Board v. Marlene Transportation Co., 27 Labor Cases § 69,119; 139 N. Y. (2) 621
(1955).
"See footnote 23.
"Raisch Motors Case (N.Y. 1955) 18 SLRB No. 26 § 49,306.
"Teamsters Local 376 AFL and Walker Motors Inc. MLMB July 7, 1955, § 49,318.
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was less than the NLRB's minimum. 44 This decision was based on
Garner, since the Supreme Court had not yet determined that state
action would be futile in the event that the NLRB refused to exercise jurisdiction.
In another Wisconsin proceeding, where the General Counsel
of the NLRB dismissed the charges on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant further proceedings, the local board
held it had jurisdiction to determine matters relating to violations
of collective bargaining contracts. 45 This was so held even though
the employers were engaged in interstate commerce, since such
conduct was neither protected nor prohibited by the Taft-Hartley
Act.
In one Federal case, it was stated that until the NLRB
actually asserts its unexercised jurisdiction, a state court may,
under proper circumstances, restrain a union from picketing an
employer whose business does not measure up to the NLRB's announced jurisdictional standards.10
This case was recently reversed,
4 7
however, the court stating:

Moreover the refusal by the NLRB to entertain the
instant grievance on its merits did not of itself alter the
pertinent law thereby revesting the state court with authority to proceed. Amended section 10 (a) of the Act specifically provides what this Court deems to be the only
way state authorities can be vested with authority now
within the exclusive purview of the Act. Unless and until
there is an express ceding of jurisdiction to a proper state
44Cooper-Utter Lumber Co., WERB May 24, 1954, LRRM 1290.
SJoseph W. Ryan v. Loberty Powder Defense Corp. (Wis. 1955) WERB Dec. No. 3895 Feb. 11,
1955 J 49498.
' Your Food Stores of Santa Fe Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 27 Labor Cases § 68867, 124 F. Supp. 697
(1954). The suit was for trespass and damages, which under the Laburnum reasoning (a well known
exception to the pre-emption doctrine) did not deprive a state court of jurisdiction to try a case
filed for damages in a tort action regardless if it was also an unfair labor practice within TaftHartley. In this case the NLRB refused on its yardstick basis to issue complaints asked for by the
union in regard to the employer's unfair labor practice. The Court cited another well-known
exception to the pre-emption doctrine, the Briggs-Stratton case (International Union U.A.W., AFL v.
WERB 16 Labor Cases 64,992, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) which allowed the state to police "partial
strike" activities under the state police power. The court in this New Mexico case, agreed that if
the NLRB does exercise its jurisdiction, the jutrisdiction of the state court would cease. Its decision,
however, was that until the NLRB actually asserts its unexercised jurisdiction, a state court may
under proper circumstances, restrain picketing if on trial of the merits thereof, said picketing is
deemed to be a trespass which in law and equity is subject to an injunction. This holding seemed
to be a clue to the attorney to always join a trespass or damage action or better to bring it in
lieu of an unfair labor practice if the NLRB does not take jurisdiction in order to get into a state
court. This case was reversed on appeal.
47 Retail Clerks Local No. 1564 v. Your Foods Stores of Santa Fe U.S. CCA, 10th, 225 F. (2d)
659 (1955).
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agency exclusive jurisdiction remains in the federal agency.
For sake of order such must be true. Otherwise an interminable problem of determining jurisdiction would exist,
throwing needless confusion into an area clearly pre-empted
by Congress.
Thus, it is now clear, at least in the 10th Circuit, the NLRB's
refusal pursuant to its 1954 yardstick standards to assert jurisdiction of a union's picketing against an interstate employer does not
vest the state court with jurisdiction over picketing.
CONCLUSION AND COMMENT

It has been estimated by an authority that at least in New
York over twenty-five percent of the employees and their employers are being deprived not only of their day in court, but also
of their rights and obligations under the Federal labor laws. 4 This
wrong without a remedy situation is the strongest argument for
the state courts that have taken jurisdiction when the NLRB declines.
Not only is there an actual lack of coverage when the states
refuse to take jurisdiction after the NLRB declines, but generally,
the quality of coverage is inferior when the states do take jurisdiction. Most states, even large ones like California, do not have
active labor boards.
There is an operational uncertainty for both labor and management, since what the NLRB giveth, it may taketh away. Yardstick
standards change; they are self-imposed and are guides only and
can be relaxed or changed as the board sees fit. Thus, the basis of
state intervention is a shifting one, dependent upon the NLRB's
operational guide. During the middle of a case or between appeal,
the parties could be thrown out on new jurisdictional grounds depending upon the ever shifting sands of the yardsticks and the discretion of the NLRB. Confusion and uncertainty are mounting
among and within the states.
If the Garmon holding is adhered to by the Supreme Court it
will constitute a set-back to the pre-emption concept and the entire purposes of Federal laws concerning collective bargaining.
Industry-wide bargaining will be an involved, if not an impossible
task, should this decision be affirmed. Different states have different laws concerning labor relations. For example, some parts
of a contract legal in State A would be illegal in State B. Also
different states have different laws in regard to the setting of the
ultimate strike date. To let the states apply different laws affecting nation-wide industry is contrary to economic realities and the
purposes of all modern Federal Labor Laws that collective bargaining should be spread as a national policy to improve the
social and economic conditions of labor and the country. Even a
conservative Congress has recognized this and has pidgeon-holed
attempts by openly anti-labor elements to further limit the juris46 Feldblum, "Jurisdictional 'Tidelands' in Labor Relations," Labor Law Journal, (February,
pp. 114, 118.

1952).
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diction of the NLRB45 and to cede tm the states full power to
regulate industries 0
As pointed out by Judge Searle in the Michigan Universal Car
case, the national policy of federal labor law and the jurisdiction
of the states cannot depend on the month to month or day to day
discretion of the NLRB, nor the different laws of the states. 1. To
base jurisdiction and the consequent application of substantive
law on changing budgetary conditions or upon the economic, political, or social views of the moment, establishes a situation
where neither the courts nor the litigants will ever know where
jurisdiction is since it may change at any time during the disposition
of the case-before action, during trial, on appeal, before decision
rendered by the Supreme Court, or even afterward!
The final answer lies with appropriate legislation by Congress.
Whether it would be to expand the budget to enable the NLRB
effectually to function and abolish its yardsticks or to blanket all
workers whose work affects interstate commerce, is for Congress
to determine. What is obvious is that the Taft-Hartley Act is in
need of revision in order to delineate Federal and State control
and to make the law applicable to all concerned.
49 The Smith Bill S. 1785, 83rd Congress 1st Sess. (1953).
-O°The Goldwater Bill S. 1161, 83rd Congress 1st Sess. (1953).
a, See footnote 17.
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COUNTY COURT RE-VISITED
By

DAVID BROFMAN

David Brofman, Judge of County
Court, City and County of Denver;
born in Louisville, Ky., 1904. He is
a former newspaper reporter, having worked on the old Denver Express, The Times, The Rocky Mountain News, and The Denver Post.
Graduated from Westminster Law
School; admitted to practice of law
1929; appointed presiding Municipal Judge 1948; has served as
Judge of the County Court since
4pril, 1951. Judge Brofman is a
vice president of United Funds,
executive vice president of Denver
Press Club, a trustee of the General Rose Hospital, president of
the Women's Alcoholic Rehabilitation Center, a member of the Mile High Charity Committee, vice president of Colorado Mental Health Association, president of Denver Chapter
of American Society for Public Administration, president of Colorado
Association of County Judges, a member of the Board of Governors of
Colorado Bar Association.

A lawyer of some thirty years' experience walked into chambers recently somewhat distressed because he was unable to find
in the Court file a document he was certain he had filed. I walked
over to the Clerk's Office with my lawyer friend and examined the
fee book into which is entered a brief description of every filed
document. The entry did not appear under the number and title
of the estate. I requested the approximate date of filing and fifteen minutes later I handed the lawyer a photographic copy of
the document - it had been filed but the case numbers had been
transposed in preparation and therefore it was resting securely in
the wrong jacket.
The lawyer was amazed at the speed with which we were able
to find the papers in spite of his error in transposing the docket
number. To the people in the County Court this is an everyday
occurrence. They merely run the microfilm of the approximate
date of filing until they find the missing papers.
"But I've been practicing in this Court for thirty years and
had no idea of its back-room equipment and operation," my lawyer
friend protested.
And I got to thinking that perhaps this was common with most
lawyers. I know that in my own case, I knew very little about
the operation of the Clerk's Office and was most certainly amazed
after twenty years of practice and five years of covering the courts
as a newspaper reporter when I got my first introduction upon
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becoming Judge of the County Court more than five years ago.
All of which leads us to the purpose of this article-to introduce
that backroom in the office of the Clerk of the County Court to you.
To begin with, you may be interested to know that the number
of documents, petitions, bonds, wills, claims, appraisals, reports, etc.
filed annually is in the neighborhood of a third of a million. Each
of these is immediately microfilmed and entered in the fee book.
The dollar volume of the responsibility of the County Court
is estimated to be in excess of $100,000,000 annually. The exact
value of the estates is not available, because in addition to current
inventories, the Court also handles testamentary trusts, some of
which will continue in perpetuity, (the Clayton Trust, for example) minor's estates, which continue until majority is reached,
and the estates of the mentally ill, which continue until restoration to reason or the decease of the ward.
I'm certain all of our lawyers have had dealings with the
Court's Auditing Department. This is the group responsible for
the accounting on this $100,000,000 worth of assets annually.
And you'll find that those "back-room" employees are always
working on improvements. Over a period of time you have noticed some changes in the form of the Will files. The Will is now
placed in a red jacket so that it may be readily "spotted." It also
has a "face" sheet. This is used so that no marking of any kind will
be placed on the Will except the exhibit marking by the reporter.
Everything is done to keep the Will intact, as it is received, including preservation of the backing and any other attachments. The
entire file is now protected with acetate foil.
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In any case in which a caveat is filed, the Will is immediately
withdrawn and locked in the Clerk's safe. A photostat is placed
in the file and the file is stamped "security." It will not be released for examination by any person, except upon clearance by
the Clerk of the Court.
In the past considerable confusion has resulted from the opening of multiple estates as to one person or the opening of an intestate estate where there is a Will. To avoid this, whenever an
estate is opened, the Clerk receiving the petition prepares a report
indicating that he made a search of the Court records and whether
he has found a living Will, lodged Will or any other type of probate proceedings involving the decedent.
We now have thousands of Wills in our living Wills file. The
security involved in the protection of such Wills includes a twin
locked vault. Entrance cannot be made by anyone except in the
presence of two attaches of the Court. A filed living Will cannot
be released during the lifetime of the testator except upon cornpliance with the statute permitting release to the maker personally
or upon acknowledged authority of the testator. Upon the death
of the testator, the Will still remains under security and will only
be released to the lodged Wills file or directly to any other probate court having jurisdiction of the estate of the decedent.
To the lawyer, one of the most important branches of the
Clerk's Office is that dealing with certified copies and the preparation of records on appeal. This, too, is big business. We prepare
approximately 25,000 certified copies annually and the lawyers pay
us over $25,000 a year for this service. Only lawyers can appreciate the care attendant to the preparation of certified copies of
such important documents as approval of sale of real estate, orders
for transfer of personal property, distribution orders, and the
numerous exemplified copies for use in obtaining full faith and
credit in the courts of our sister states. Orders for these copies are
received from all parts of the world.
To give you an idea of the increase in business in the Denver
County Court since 1932, the following charts are presented:
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HERON ENGINEERING COMPANY
2000 South Acoma Street, Denver
SPruce 7-4497

Consultations, Investigations, Reports,
Designs, Plans, Surveys, Estimates,
Specifications, Supervision of
Construction and Appraisals

We Oer

Colorado £awyers

a complete Engineering Service gained in forty years active
practice, at all times keeping abreast of modern scientific and
engineering developments, and covering Water Supply Systems, Dams, Irrigation Works, Sewerage and Sewage Disposal,
Steam, Gas, Oil and Hydro Electric Power Plans, Electric Transmission Lines, Chemical and Metallurgical Developments
and Plants, Buildings, Aerial Tramways, Railroads, Bridges,
Foundations, Highways and Streets, Airports and Hangars,
Land Surveys, Land Classification, and Mining Developments.

0

Any Engineering Problem Presented to Us
Will Receive Our Prompt, Careful
and Expert Attention

July-August, 1956

DICTA

NOTABLE TRIALS OF JUDGES
BY EVERETT E. SMITH

Everett E. Smith: admitted to the Minnesota bar in 1933;
practised law in Minneapolis, Washington, D. C., and Kansas
City; former appellate counsel in Denver for the Internal Revenue Service; former Assistant Judge Advocate of the Third
Army in Europe; private practice in Denver since 1954.
It is the business--and happy prerogative-of judges to judge
others. Seldom in Anglo-American legal experience has History
thrust upon a high magistrate the opposite, unenviable role of the
judged. Rare and dramatic occasions of such a reversal of roles and
fortunes, from the time of England's Francis Bacon to that of America's Judge Manton, are the subject of the present review.
Regardless of the resulting verdict, there is a substantial element of tragedy in any trial which requires an individual to vindicate himself or suffer the consequences. Ordinarily, the sheer number of trials occurring daily in the courts prevents any sense of the
personal tragedy from extending beyond those most immediately
concerned to a wider public. In the unusual case of an impeached
or accused judge, it is easier to see the trial for what it is.
BACON

In 1618, Sir Francis Bacon, who already had been Solicitor
General and Attorney General, was raised to peerage and appointed
Lord Chancellor by James I. As Lord Chancellor, Bacon was judge
of the Chancery Court, which exercised sole jurisdiction over suits
in equity. Four years later, in 1622, this brilliant lawyer and judge
-so versatile he took all knowledge for his province and so talented
he is believed by some to have written the works of Shakespearewas impeached by the House of Commons. The House of Lords demanded an answer to the twenty-eight articles of impeachment
charging bribery. Bacon's answer was "I do plainly and ingenuously confess that I am guilty of corruption and do renounce all
defense**." He was sentenced to pay a fine of £40,000, to be imprisoned during the king's pleasure and to be incapable of sitting in
parliament. The king remitted the fine and imprisonment.
Bacon acknowledged the justice of Parliament's action against
him in an oft-quoted remark which seems to condemn that body for
having been remiss in not taking action sooner and against other
judges: "I was the justest judge that was in England these 50
years: But it was the justest censure in Parliament that was these
200 years." The remark also is consistent with Bacon's position that
the moneys received from suitors in Chancery pendente lite were
but gifts which did not affect nor change his judgment. In his enforced retirement, Bacon devoted himself to literary and philosophical work. He died in 1626.1
Bacon's confession of corruption may be accepted as sufficient
See 5 Holdsworth's History of English Law (1924) pp. 240-261; "De Montmorency on Bacon"
in Great Jurists of the World (1914) pp. 144-168; 3 Campbell, Lives of the Lord Chancellors (1880)
pp. 53-127; Rossmon, Coke and Bacon (1952) 38 American Bar Association Journal 42.
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proof that the charges against him were well grounded. This does
not rule out the possibility that they were to some extent politically
motivated. In the struggle of that time between King and Parliament, Bacon was an adherent of the former. It was the latter body,
with which Bacon's rival, Sir Edward Coke, had aligned himself,
which made and acted upon the charges-a circumstance which
tempts the observation that Parliament "Coked" the King's Bacon.
Whatever the fact in Bacon's case, there seems to be considerable
agreement among the commentators that the next
trial to be con2
sidered was brought about for political reasons.
PICKERING

John Pickering, a United States district judge who formerly
had been Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire,
was the first federal judge to become enmeshed in the toils of the
law. On February 4, 1803, President Jefferson sent to the House
of Representatives a message referring to Judge Pickering's conduct
in the Eliza case and suggesting an impeachment. The case mentioned had been a proceeding to forfeit the ship Eliza for violation
of the customs revenue laws. The judge had refused to hear
witnesses in the case, peremptorily had ordered the ship returned
to its captain, and had refused to permit an appeal.
On March 2, 1804, a House Committee reported a resolution for
Pickering's impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors. The
resolution was adopted immediately. The judge did not answer or
appear at his trial, but his son presented a petition alleging his
father's madness and praying that the Senate receive evidence to
that effect. The Senate agreed to hear it, but only in mitigation of
the misconduct charged. On March 12, 1804, the sixty-seven year
old judge was convicted by a vote of 19 to 7, and sentenced to removal from office. He died in April of the next year.
The Pickering case has generated considerable comment. Senator Beveridge, the biographer of John Marshall, accepts the view
that the judge was "hopelessly insane" and as a result had become
"an incurable drunkard." He refers to Henry Adams' characterization of the conviction as infamous and illegal.3 In his article on
the impeachment of the federal judiciary, Brown expresses doubt
of Pickering's insanity and adds, with seeming irrelevance, that if4
insanity did exist it "was attributable to habitual intemperance".
A federal court has mentioned the historian McMaster's concurrence in the verdict of Henry Adams. The court also stated that
after his conviction "Pickering was adjudged insane by proper
authority." 5

According to the Constitution, federal judges hold their offices
during good behavior but are impeachable only for treason, bribery
or other high crimes or misdemeanors. 6 It seems fairly clear that
2 See Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice (1937) pp. 54-55; 3 Beveridge, Life of John
Marshall (1919) pp. 143, 164 and 167.
See 3 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (1919) 143 and 164 et. seq.
4 Brown, The Impeachment of the Federal Judiciary (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 684, 700.
. Ritter v. United States (Ct. CIs., 1936) 84 Ct. CIs. 293, 299 cert .den. 300 U. S. 668.
6 Article Ill and section 4 of Article II. See also Article 1, section 3, cl. 6; Article 1, section 3,
cl. 7; Article 1, section 2, cl. 5; Article II, section 2, cl. 1; Article III, section 2, cl. 2.
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performing judicial duties while drunk is a lapse from good behavior. That such conduct constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor
is less clear but not a wholly unwarranted conclusion if the constitutional category of crimes and misdemeanors is construed as qualified by the concept of good behavior. Moreover, it is far more
serious for a judicial officer (as for a military officer) to be drunk
on duty than it ordinarily is for a private individual to be drunk
off-duty.
By the common law, an accused generally has a defense to a
criminal charge if at the time of the act or conduct in question his
state of mind was that characterized by the criminal law as insane.
According to one view of the situation in the Pickering case, the
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respondent's insanity, far from being recognized as a defense, was
even begrudged any consideration in mitigation or extenuation.
It seems sufficiently clear that insanity or mental incompetence
on the part of a judge is, per se, neither misbehavior nor a high
crime or misdemeanor. Perhaps the conduct flowing
from such
7
mental impairment stands on a different footing.
The truth seems to be, however, that there is no wholly satisfactory solution to a substantive legal problem such as that presented by the Pickering case (assuming the judge was in an irrational and not merely a drunken state at the time of the proceedings in the Eliza case). The Constitution contains no provision
for the removal of a federal judge who is mentally incompetent or
suffering from a disabling physical ailment.8 Nevertheless, a separation of the unfortunate officer from judicial functions seems
warranted in the public interest. To effect the removal by impeachment seems comparable to clipping fingernails with a guillotine, but it is doubtful that any other method is permissable
under the Constitution. 9
The procedure followed by the Senate sitting as a Court of
Impeachment in Judge Pickering's case reveals several contrasts
with the presently approved procedure in the regular, federal
courts. The Court proceeded to hear the charges without regard,
apparently, to the judge's capacity at that time to understand
the charges and to cooperate with counsel in his defense.' 0 Again,
the Court of Impeachment did not consider the presence of the
judge or his representation by counsel as indispensable under
the circumstances." The trial proceeded in his absence and in the
absence of counsel.
In noting the foregoing it is not intended to suggest that the
rules developed by the regular federal judiciary for the cases
within its cognizance are ipso facto standards of perfection to
which Courts of Impeachment should conform in the exercise
7 This paragraph is not intended to suggest that impeachable offenses are to be equated with
:riminal offenses.
Cf. 3 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (1919) p. 165.
il Cf. Ritter v. United States, cited in footnote 5; Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment
Power under the Constitution (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 330; Note, Removal of Federal Judges; A
Proposed Plan (1937) 31 III. 1. R. 631.
10See Massey v. Moore (1954) 75 Sup. Ct. 145.
ii Cf. Hopt v. Utah (1884) 110 U. S. 262. But cf. Blackmer v. United States (1932) 284 U. S. 421.
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of their jurisdiction. To the extent such rules of procedure are
founded upon reasons of justice, however, departures should be
warranted by the difference in the nature of the cases which
come before the Courts of Impeachment or not be made.
CHASE

Within an hour after John Pickering was convicted, the
House voted to impeach Samuel Chase, an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, for high crimes and misdemeanors.'
The justice, who was about sixty-four years of age at the time,
had been a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a leader
of the Maryland bar, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Maryland. President Washington had appointed Chase to the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1796, about eight years
prior to the initiation of the proceedings against the justice.
The eight articles of impeachment presented to the Senate
almost a year after the aforesaid vote to impeach called in question the justice's charge to a grand jury at Baltimore in 1803;
his attempt in Delaware to secure an indictment under the sedition law by inquisitorial methods; his legal rulings and conduct in 1800 in the trials of John Fries for treasonous resistance to federal taxation and of James Callender for violation
of the federal sedition law. In the charge to the grand jury,
Justice Chase had attacked universal suffrage, criticized President Jefferson's administration as weak, and disapproved the
repeal of the Circuit Court Act by the Jefferson administration.
In the second trial of Fries in Philadelphia, Chase had made up
his mind on the law of treason before the jury was sworn. In
Virginia, he had treated counsel for Callender with sarcastic
contempt. This, in brief, was the tenor of the charges.
On February 4, 1805, the Senate convened as a Court of
Impeachment to hear the charges. Vice President Aaron Burr
with but a month of office remaining, presided. Chief Justice
Marshall, later to be a witness in the case, was a worried spectator. The other justices of the Supreme Court likewise were
present. Among the managers for the House was John Randolph
of Roanoke, Virginia. Chief among the brilliant array of counsel for the respondent was Luther Martin, the bibulous leader
of the Maryland bar.
The details of the evidence and argument in this celebrated
American counterpart of the trial of Warren Hastings need not
detain us here. Beveridge's Life of Marshall and Warren's Supreme
Court in United States History evoke the color, pageantry and
significance of this occasion as Macaulay did for the British prototype. It is enough to point out that when the arguments were
over and the Senate had voted, there was not a two-thirds majority for conviction on any of the articles. On March 1, 1805,
Burr announced that Chase was acquitted of all the articles exhibited against him.
12 3 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (1919) p.

169.
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During the trial, the Senate held its legislative sessions in
a Committee room before noon. The court sessions were held
in the Senate Chamber in the afternoon. As for Justice Chase,
neither the trial nor the physical pain which he suffered from
the gout prevented him from taking his seat upon the Bench at
the 1805 Term. Though continuing to suffer from the gout, Chase
lived until 1811.13
The decisions in the Eliza, Fries and Callender cases invite
several incidental, slightly satirical, reflections. Is the "gastronomic school of jurisprudence" comforted or confounded by the
possibility that Judge Pickering's impaired reason and Justice
Chase's afflicted feet may have affected their judgment in the
mischievous cases mentioned? May one infer from the fact that
the respective counsel in the Fries and Callender cases threw up
their briefs that contented feet are even more important to good
judgment than sound reason, sobriety, or a well-regulated digestion?
HALSTED L. RITTER

Of the two federal judges impeached during the remainder
of the nineteenth century, one, James H. Peck, Judge of the
133 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (1919) pp. 169-222; 1 Warren, Supreme Court in United
3tates History (New, rev. ed., 1928) pp. 276 et seq.; 4 Dictionary of American Biography pp.
35-37. For the Fries case, see 11 Lawson's American State Trials pp. 146-174. See also the report
of the Callender case in 10 Lawson's American State Trials 813 et seq.
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United States District Court for the District of Missouri, was
acquitted; the other, West H. Humphries, Judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Tennessee, was convicted on charges relating to activities in aid of the Southern
Confederacy. In this century, there has been one conviction, one
resignation to forestall trial, and two acquittals prior to the trial
of Judge Halsted L. Ritter in 1936.14
Judge Ritter, who had lived and practiced law with distinction for thirty years in Denver, Colorado, went to Florida in
1925 because of his wife's health. 15 He took office as a United
States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida in February, 1929. The original impeachment resolution was introduced
in the House of Representatives in May, 1933. An investigation
and report were made. There the matter rested until 1936, when,
a week after the Supreme Court invalidated the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, the question was raised again. On January 14,
1936, Representative Green of Florida on his own
responsibility
16
as a member of the House revived the charges.
The House agreed upon a resolution to impeach Judge Ritter
of misbehavior and high crimes and misdemeanors on March 2,
1936.17 Amendments were made on March 31, 1936.18 In brief,
the respondent was charged with practising law in violation of
statute; receiving fees and gratuities; income tax violations; and
the final article, 7, combined various charges, most of which, if
not all, were pleaded in the preceding six articles. The respondent filed an answer on April 3, 1936 which pleaded that the alleged offenses were not impeachable and also contained a denial
of the articles of impeachment. 19 A formal replication was made
on behalf of the House.
On April 6, 1936, the trial began with the opening statements
made on behalf of the House and the respondent. 20 Thereafter,
the Senate sitting (and sworn) as a Court of Impeachment
held daily sessions from noon to 1:30 P. M. and from 2:00 o'clock
to 5:30 P. M. Between 25 and 30 witnesses were heard. Questions
by members of the Court were reduced to writing and put by the
Presiding Officer. Closing arguments were made on April 13 and
14.21 On April 17, 1936, the roll call of Senators revealed less
than the two-thirds majority constitutionally required for conviction on the first six articles. The respondent was convicted
of the 22charges in the seventh article, and adjudged removed from
office.
Thereafter, Judge Ritter filed a petition in the United States
Court of. Claims seeking to recover his judge's salary for the
month of April, 1936. In this suit, the petitioner raised anew
the claim that the charges made in the articles of impeachment
14 For details,
Federal Judgeship
1 5 74th Cong.,
16 74th Cong.,
17 74th Cong.,
IR 74th Cong.,
I974th Cong.,
20 74th Cong.,
"2 74th Cong.,
22 74th Cong.,

see Brown's article, cited in footnote 4 and Ten Broek, Partisan
Impeachment Since 1903 (1939) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 185.
2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 3, p. 3088; pt. 4, p. 3646.
2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 1, p. 404.
2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 3, p. 3066, 3092.
2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 4, pp. 4654-55.
2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 5, pp. 4899 et seq.
2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 5, pp. 4972 et seq.
2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 5, pp. 5401 et seq.
2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 5, pp. 5602, 5606-5607.
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were not impeachable offenses. The conviction on the seventh
article was attacked on the ground that the matters alleged in
that article
were merely restatements of the charges in the prior
23
articles.
The Court of Claims dismissed the petition, stating (at page
300):
"Our conclusion is that we have no authority to review the impeachment proceedings held in the Senate and
decide whether the accusations made against the plaintiff
were such that he could properly be impeached thereon,
nor can we pass upon the question of whether his acquittal on the first six articles was a bar to prosecution under
the seventh. In our opinion, the Senate was the sole tribunal that could take jurisdiction of the articles of impeachment presented to that body against the plaintiff
and its decision is final."
BEN B. LINDSEY
There is some disagreement among the commentators about
the merits of the impeachment procedure. It is not the only
means, however, which has been used for bringing a judge to
trial with respect to his judicial conduct. In one very difficult
but interesting case involving a former state judge, the judge
was called upon to vindicate himself in a disbarment proceeding.
In another instance, a judge of a United States Circuit Court of
Appeals was tried in the regular federal courts on criminal
charges.
Prior to the expiration of his term of office in July, 1927,
the well-known Judge Ben B. Lindsey of the Juvenile Court of
Denver, Colorado had received sums totalling $47,500 which gave
rise to an original proceeding in disbarment in the Supreme Court
of Colorado. The information filed on behalf of the State charged
that the receipt of the two sums comprising the total was illegal
and gravely unethical in that they represented unlawful extra
compensation to the respondent as judge or fees for the wrongful
practice of law by a judge, or both.
The judge's answer admitted the receipt in 1926 of $37,500
from the mother, and guardian of the estate, of two minor children as well as the receipt in the same year of $10,000 from Samuel Untermyer, the New York lawyer who had asserted for the
guardian the right of the children to share in the estate of their
deceased father, the guardian's divorced husband. The judge's
answer asserted, however, that said sums were not legal fees
nor extra compensation to him as judge but gifts made in recognition of his friendly mediation in the dispute between the
mother and her children on the one side and the claimant under
the decedent's will on the other. The will proceedings were pending in a surrogate court of New York.
The State moved for judgment and the case was decided on
23 Ritter v. United States, cited in footnote 5.
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the pleadings. The Supreme Court of Colorado held that Judge
Lindsey should be disbarred. The decision was based, primarily
at least, on the view that the moneys received by Judge Lindsey
were legal fees. On the Supreme Court's denial of an application
which the judge made for reinstatement several years later, two
justices dissented. One of the dissenting justices made the following observations which illuminate the above-mentioned difficulties of the case:
"The respondent has made it difficult for a member
of the court to vote for his reinstatement. After his
disbarment, he published attacks upon the members of the
court, assailing them in language that I do not approve.**
"In the typical disbarment case the misconduct of the
respondent generally results in injury to some person. In
the present case no person suffered injury by reason of the
respondent's conduct. On the contrary, every person connected with the transaction received a substantial benefit
by reason of the respondent's activities, was highly pleased,
and expressed gratitude to the respondent for his efforts."
renewed application for
Two years later the respondent's
24
reinstatement was granted.
MARTTN T. MANTON

Judge Martin T. Manton, the senior judge of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, having
been convicted by a jury of conspiracy to obstruct the administration of justice and to defraud the United States, appealed.
The judge raised a number of points, the most noteworthy of which
for present purposes was to the effect that he had not obstructed
justice by receiving money from suitors in various specified
civil cases pending before him because in the favorable decisions
for such suitors he had voted to decide the cases according to
law. The appellate court overruled that contention summarily,
saying (at page 845) "Judicial action, whether just or unjust,
right or wrong, is not for sale."
The Circuit Court's decision affirming Judge Manton's conviction was rendered on December 4, 1938. Not until February,
1939, did the judge resign from the bench.
25 Thereafter, the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
There is an element of grim, ironic humor in a comparison
of the first and last of these tragedies chosen from the assortment of legal history. In the last case, the law appears to have
been sufficiently elastic to permit the court on which Judge
Manton sat to enter correct decisions in favor of the bribing
litigants. In the time of Bacon, it was not so, and some of the
gift-giving suitors had to be disappointed in the Lord Chancellor's
just judgments.
24 People v. Lindsey (Colo.,1929) 283 Pac. 539; (1933) 23 P. 2d 118; (1935) 52 P. 2d 663. See
Lindsey and Borough, The Dangerous Life (1931) for the judge's reaction to his disbarment and
Sears and Goldman, Disbarment of Judge Lindsey (1931) 25 I1. L. R. 569, for a disinterested
comment.
25 United States v. Manton (2nd Cir., 1938) 107 F. 2d 834, cert. den. (1940) 309 U. S. 664.
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THE EFFECT OF TAX TITLES UPON EASEMENTS
AND RESTRICTIONS UPON THE USE OF
LAND IN COLORADO
By

WILLIAM

E.

KENWORTHY

William E. Kenworthy received
a B.S. in Law from the University
of Denver in 1955 and expacts to
receive the LL.B. from the same institution in December, 1956. He is
currently student managing editor
of Dicta, a member of Phi Delta
Phi, and a former member of the
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In view of the great number of titles in Colorado which have
at one time or another passed through a tax sale, it is not surprising to find the question occasionally arising as to the effect
of a tax title upon various interests. Specifically, questions involving easements, restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes
(sometimes called negative easements) involve a good deal of
uncertainty. It seems to be generally assumed that such interests
are extinguished by a tax title. Whether that assumption is valid
is the question presented here. It is hoped that this article may
help to provide an approach to a solution of that question.
I.

EFFECT OF A TAX DEED TO THE DOMINANT ESTATE

It is well settled that the owner of land under a tax title may
enforce all appurtenant servitudes and easements which existed
prior to the tax sale.1 In Colorado the statute regarding treasurer's
deeds clearly seems to ordain that the purchaser of a tax title may
enforce any rights which the previous owner possessed. That
statute states:
The deed shall be signed by the treasurer in his official
capacity and when so signed shall vest in the purchaser all
the right, title, interest and estate of the former owner
in and to the land conveyed and also all right,2 title,
interest and claim of the state and county thereto.
I
2

11 Am. Law of Property, sec. 9.40; 168 A.L.R. 529.
1953 C.R.S. 137-10-37; see also Pyles v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 76 Colo. 598, 233 Pac.

618 (1925).
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II.

EFFECT OF A TAX DEED TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE

A. IN GENERAL
Analytically there would seem to be no sound basis for a
distinction between the effect of a tax deed upon the benefit or
upon the burden of a land use restriction. Yet the courts display
a definite split of authority as to whether a grantee under a tax
deed takes the land subject to restrictions. An implicit premise
in the decisions on this subject may be a policy against the running of the burden of covenants3 In passing it should be noted
that this is a policy which has found statutory sanction in Colorado.'
Other policy considerations play a part in the decisions as well.
On one hand there are those who regard the security of titles as
the Holy Grail of all attorneys. On the other hand others state
that the question involved here is whether one person shall be
deprived of property rights because another failed to pay his taxes.
This had led some courts to say that to allow tax titles to extinguish the rights in question would be a deprivation of property
without due process of lawA
There are at least two major factors upon which the decisions
on this subject rest. The first of these is whether the tax sale is
a proceeding in personam or in rem. If the proceeding is in personam, the grantee of a tax deed acquires a derivative title. Hence
he takes the land subject to all burdens and restrictions enforceable against the previous owner.6
Where the tax foreclosure is a proceeding in rem, a new title
to the property is created. It is well settled in Colorado that a tax

deed initiates a new title.7 However, this does not solve the problem, for even in those jurisdictions following the new title theory
ORestatement of Property (1944), div. V, pt. III, Introductory Note; II Am. Law of Property,
sec. 9.14; compare Sims, "The Low of Real Covenants," 30 Corn. L. Q. 1.
1953 C.R.S. 118-8-1 and 3.
5Alvin v. Johnson, 241 Minn. 257, 63 N.W. 2nd 22 (1954); Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9,
106 N.E. 751 (1914); Crawford v. Senosky, 128 Ore. 229, 274 Pac. 306 (1929).
0 II Am. Law cf Property, sec. 9.40.
7 McDermott v. Bent Co. Irr. Dist., 130 Colo. 44, 272 P. 2nd 995 (1954); Henrylyn Irr. Dist. v.
Patterson, 65 Colo. 385, 176 Pac. 493 (1918); Morris v. Grouberger, 59 Colo. 164, 147 Pac. 674
(1915); Foster v. Clark, 21 Colo. App. 192, 121 Pac. 130 (1912), Wells v. Brown, 23 Colo. App.
190, 128 Pac. 869 (1913); Gibson v. Bragg, 24 Colo. App. 463, 135 Pac. 119 (1913); Sherman v.
Greeley Building & Loan Ass'n., 66 Colo. 288, 181 Pac. 975 (1919).
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there is conflict in the decisions.8
The more modern approach places emphasis on the basis of
assessment. If land is assessed with regard to any enhanced or
depreciated value because of easements or use restrictions, then
such interests are unaffected by a tax deed. On the other hand,
where the tax is assessed against the realty without regard to
separate estates, such interests are extinguished.
There is Colorado authority for such a view in the case of
Mitchell v. Espinosa,'0 which though not strictly in point deals
with an analogous problem. It was there held that where there
had been no valid assessment of severed mineral interests, a tax
deed could not affect the rights of the mineral owners. The principle was broadly stated that a valid assessment is essential to a
valid treasurer's deed. However, in deciding the case, the Court
laid stress upon the fact that by the terms of the statute severed
mineral interests are separately assessable. In contrast 1953 C.R.S.
137-1-15 provides:
For the purposes of taxation it shall make no difference
that the possession, use or ownership of any such property
is qualified, limited, not the subject of alienation, or the
subject of levy or distraint separately for the particular
tax derivable therefrom.
B. EASEMENTS
The argument might be made that the above statute applies
to appurtenant easements as well as to mere restrictions on use.
Similar statutes have been construed in that manner.1" Nevertheless it must be remembered that appurtenant easements are more
tangible property interests than mere restrictions. In many instances an easement may approach ownership of the fee for all
practical purposes, e.g. railroad rights of way, easements for a
canal. Consequently, it has been held that easements are interests
in land within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. 2 Therefore
it is suggested that easements, at least those which as a practical
matter can be separately assessed, may come within the doctrine
of Mitchell v. Espinosa."8
There is one Colorado case on this subject which has been the
subject of varying interpretations. 1 4 The plaintiff was seeking relief against the closing of an alley to his ingress and egress. The
alley in question had never been conveyed to the city; consequently the land had been taxed and conveyed by treasurer's deed
to the defendant. The trial court's judgment for the defendant
sAn extensive annotation on the subject may be found at 168 A.L.R. 529. Subsequently the
following cases have held that easements are not extinguished by a tax deed: Alvin v. Johnson. 241
Minn. 257, 63 N.W. 2nd 22 (1954); Engel v. Catucci, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 54, 197 F. 2nd 597 (1952);
Evans v. City of Jackson, 201 Miss. 14, 28 So. 2nd 249 (1946). Contra: Kern v. Schaar, 338 Mich.
637, 62 N.W. 2nd 614 (1954); Douthett v. Walkotten, 335 Mich. 612, 56 N.W. 2nd 399 (1953).
0 Engel v. Catucci, 197 F. 2nd 597 (1952), and cases cited therein.
. 125 Colo. 267, 243 P. 2nd 412 (1952); Johnson v. McLaughlin, 125 Colo. 298, 242 P. 2nd
812 (1952).
nWolfson v. Hens,.149 Fla. 499, 6 So. 2nd 858 (1942); Hill v. Williams, 104 Md. 595, 65 A.
413 (1906).
1Stewart v. Stevens, 10 Colo. 440, 15 Pac. 786 (1887); Workman v. Stephenson, 26 Colo.
App. 342 (1914).
13Supro, note 9.
14 Smith v. Griffin, 14 Colo. 429, 27 Pac. 905 (1890).
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was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
From the result of the case and certain language contained
in it, some authorities feel that the case is authority for the proposition that a tax title extinguishes an easement. Specifically they
refer to the statement at page 430 that if appellant (the former
owner) was trying to close the alley and a purchaser from him of
a lot in the block was objecting, appellant would be estopped from
interfering with the use of the alley. Therefore, it is said by
some, because the land passed through a tax sale, the easement
was destroyed. It is submitted that this view is fallacious in that
it fails to distinguish between the refusal to create an easement
by estoppel and the destruction of an existing easement by a
tax title.
The actual holding of the case, as stated at 168 A.L.R. 535 is
that no easement ever existed in the alley. At page 430 the court
said:
The title passed to Mrs. Griffin under her tax deed;
and, unless subject to an easement, she acquired the right
to fence and use it in accordance with the dictates of her
private interest. (emphasis supplied.)
Thereafter the court proceeded to hold that: (1) No estoppel
against Mrs. Griffin existed; (2) No easement by express grant
was made; (3) No prescriptive right had been acquired; (4) No
case was made for a way of necessity. Thus the court seems to
have assumed that a tax sale would not extinguish an existing
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easement; then it held that an easement had never existed. It is
obvious that most of the opinion would have been unnecessary
if the court had decided that a treasurer's deed extinguishes an
easement. If anything, the case stands for the proposition that an
easement survives.
A peculiar situation arose in a recent case in North Dakota
where it was held that a tax title destroys a subsequently established prescriptive easement." It was disclosed that the adverse
user would have ripened into a prescriptive easement sometime
between 1908 and 1938. The treasurer's deed was not issued until
1938, but it was held that the title thus acquired related back to
1909, the date of the earliest unpaid assessment. This was held to
prevent the acquisition of a prescriptive right since a "new title"
had been created. It was also recognized by the court that, "Only
the interest properly assessed can be sold at a tax sale."
The trend of the later decisions seems to be toward the position that tax titles do not extinguish existing easements appurtenant.1" These cases and the policy expressed in them have led to
of the rule that easethe adoption in the Restatement of Property
ments appurtenant are not extinguished. 17 It is felt that even
though easements are not separately assessed, an assessment based
upon actual value must reflect their existence by lower values on
the servient estate and higher values on the dominant estate. Logic
would require that this principle be limited to those easements
which would be reasonably apparent to an assessor.
Finally it should be noted that the reasoning fails when applied
to easements in gross. In such instances there is no dominant
estate which can be assessed to reflect the value of the easement.
Consequently easements in gross probably would be extinguished
by a tax title."'
C. EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
If the basis of assessment theory is to be followed, several
difficulties will be encountered in Colorado in determining the
basis of assessment. As previously noted, 1953 C.R.S. 137-1-15
states that for purposes of taxation it shall make no difference
that the use of property is qualified or limited. Yet 1953 C.R.S.
137-1-2 provides that "All taxable property ... shall be assessed
at its full cash value." The fact that there are restrictions upon
the use of land is certain to be reflected in its market value. It
might therefore be said that restrictions on the use of land are
reflected in the basis of assessment-full cash value. Certain cases
have followed that line of reasoning.1 9
Further complications are caused by the Colorado rule that

I5

Conlin v. Metzger, 77 N.D. 620. 44 N.W. 2nd 617 (1950).
16 See note 7. Alvin v. Johnson, 241 Minn. 257, 63 N.W. 2nd 22, and Engel v. Catucci, 197 F.
2nd 597, are particularly well considered cases with extensive citation of authorities.
17Restatement of Property, sec. 509 (2).
1t Restatement of Property, sec. 509 (1); Hunt v. Boston, 183 Moss. 303, 67 N.E. 244 (1903);
cf. Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 A. 351, 40 A.L.R. 1516 (1924).
19 Crawford v. Senosky, 128 Ore. 229, 274 Pac. 306 (1929); Alamogordo tmprov. Co. v. Prendergost, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P. 2nd 428, 122 A.L.R. 1277 (1939); Schlafly v. Baumann, 341 Mo. 755,
108 S.W. 2nd 363 (1937). The same contention was specifically rejected in Nedderman v. Des
Moines, 221 Iowa 1352, 268 N.W. 36 (1936).
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restrictions on the use of property are not an estate or interest
in land.2 0 The difficulty of holding that rights which are not interests or estates in land may be included in the basis of assessment
for real estate taxes is readily apparent. On the other hand one
wonders how the sale of land for taxes can affect rights which are
not realty. Of the other states following this view only Washington seems to have considered the effect of tax titles on land use
restrictions. 2 ' The decisions in the Washington cases are based
upon a peculiar statute relating to tax liens in holding that a tax
Probably the statement
title extinguishes all prior interests.2
that restrictions on the use of land are not estates or interests
therein should be restricted to cases involving the Statute of
Frauds where it originated. Its application to the present question
leads nowhere.
Considerations of public policy also play a role in the decisions
on this subject. It has been said that restrictive covenants and
servitudes in subdivisions enhance the value of the land, and that
to destroy this servitude would be to diminish the assessed valuation of the surrounding lots. The following premise is that tax
sales should not have the effect of reducing the assessed valuation
in the community. 2 3 In Hayes v. Gibbs the court said:
We do not believe that the legislature intended, nor
do the holdings of this court lend color to the theory, that
tax lien foreclosures and sales should decrease the value
of the realty holdings of citizens by destroying restrictions
on the use of real estate mutually beneficial to individual
citizens in increasing the value of such holdings and the
state in increasing its revenue from taxation.
However these decisions are probably inapplicable in Colorado in
statutes and cases favoring
view of the policy expressed in both
24
the free and unrestricted use of land.
- Thornton v. Schobe, 79 Colo. 25, 243 Pac. 617 (1926).
Johnson v. Mt. Baker Park Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 Pac. 536 (1920), held
that an equitable servitude was enforceable ,ven though oral.
Messett v. Cowell, 194 Wash. 646, 79 P. 2nd 337 (1938); Hanson v. Carr, 66 Wash. 81, 118
Pac. 927 (1911).
23 Schlafly v. Baurnann, 341 Mo. 755, 108 S.W. 2nd 363 (1937); Northwestern Improv. Co. v.
Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P. 2nd 792, 110 A.L.R. 605 (1937); Alamogordo Improv. Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P. 2nd 428, 122 A.L.R. 1277 (1939); Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.
2nd 781, 168 A.L.R. 513 (1946); Restatement of Property, sec. 567.
21 1953 C.R.S. 118-1-1 and 3; Flaks v. Wichman, 128 Colo. 45, 260 P. 2nd 737 (1953).
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D. CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT AND POSSIBILITIES
OF REVERTER
All that has been previously said with regard to equitable
servitudes is equally applicable to rights reserved exclusively in
the grantor and his heirs. However, there is a distinction between these interests which makes it possible to say with a degree
of certainty that rights reserved in the grantor are extinguishable
by a tax title.
In Alamogordo Improv. Co. v. Hennessee25 it was held that
under the New Mexico statutes a tax deed created a new title
which extinguished a possibility of reverter. In holding that an
equitable servitude was not extinguished by a tax title the Montana court stated that the New Mexico case was correct but not
in point. 2 ' The distinction was confirmed two years later by the
Supreme Court of New Mexico when it was confronted with an
identical restriction phrased as an equitable servitude. 27 It was
stated that the Hennessee case properly held that a reversionary
interest was destroyed by a tax title but that the decision was not
controlling where rights enforceable in equity were involved.
Equitable servitudes were then held to survive a tax sale.
The rationale of these decisions is not clearly stated, but there
would appear to be a clear distinction between the effect of a tax
title upon the rights of parties in the chain of title and of those
whose only link is a common grantor. In addition the cases may
be analyzed on the same basis that easements in gross and easements appurtenant are distinguished. With reversionary interests
there is no parcel of land to which the right can be said to be
appurtenant so as to increase its assessed valuation. But equitable
servitudes are rights running with certain parcels of land and will
thereby affect assessments.
E. CONCLUSION
Thus this discourse nears its end having proven little more
than that its writer doesn't know any answers. For those desiring
an answer, it can be found in the Denver and Colorado Bar Association Title Standards, No. 47. It is stated there that, "Such
a tax deed extinguishes any restrictive covenants existing prior
to the tax deed." With due regard for the Title Standards Committee it is suggested that under the present state of the law such
a positive assertion may not be justified.
" 40 N.M. 162, 56 P. 2nd 1127 (1936).
0Northwestern
Improv. Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P. 2nd 792, 110 A.L.R. 605 (1937).
' Alamogordo Improv. Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P. 2nd 428, 122 A.L.R. 1277 (1939).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Equitable Servitudes in Colorado With Emphasis on Pagel v. Gisi
BY GERALD E. SCHMIDT

Gerald Schmidt received his BSL from the University of Wyoming in June, 1955 and expects to receive a LL.B. from Denver
University in December, 1956. He is a member of Phi Delta
Phi legal fraternity and expects to continue studies in accounting after graduation.
A class action was brought to enforce a restriction in the form
of a condition subsequent with a right of abrogation reserved to
the grantor. It was further qualified as a covenant running with
the land and binding upon both parties. There was no provision
indicating that the restriction was intended for the benefit of the
common grantees and, although the defendant had actual notice
of the restriction before he purchased, it was omitted from his
chain of title.' The restriction was never included in more than
twenty per cent of the total lots although one block of ten lots was
not offered for sale.
The first issue determined by the court was whether this restriction was personal to the grantee or constituted an equitable
servitude which was enforceable by all the grantees.
There have been two distinct approaches to construing restrictions. The first is the so-called New York Rule2 where property
values are protected and the harsh rule of revisionary interests
are avoided by disregarding the written words and substituting the
Itmore probable intent" of the parties to arrive at a covenant for
the benefit of the common grantees. The second is the rule of
1 Pagel v. Gisi.....
Colo. _, 1955 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 13, p. 478. (This quotation was taken
from the brief of the plaintiff in error which was filed in the Supreme Court of Colorado, 6
January, 1955.)
This deed is executed by the grantor and accepted by the grantees subject to the following
restrictions, reservations, and conditions, viz:
That said premises will be used for dwelling houses only, and that any dwelling that is hereafter erected by party of the second part, his successors and assigns, on this lot to be at a cost
of not less than $4,000.00 or to be upon plans to be approved by the grantor, his heirs or
assigns, should such dwelling be of less value, and this covenant is to be incorporated in any
deed given by party of the second part or second party's grantees, and any violation of these
restrictions, reservations, and conditions shall cause said premises hereby to revert to the original
grantor or his heirs and assigns, it being understood that the above restrictions, reservations, and
conditions are covenants running with the land and binding upon the heirs and assigns of both
parties thereto.
2 Post v. Well, 1 N. Y. Supp. 807, 22 N. E. 145.
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strict construction 3 which appears to be statutory in Colorado.'
Colorado has previously followed this rule to the letter, as in the
recent case of Flaks v. Wichman where the words "private residence" were held to exclude duplexes.
There are no words in this restriction which indicate that anything other than a condition subsequent was intended. Certainly,
the provision that such restriction was to be a "covenant running
with the land" does not change the nature of the intended condition, because such phraseology was the standard wording of common law conditions, and was only inserted to show that the intent
of the parties was that the condition was to run with the land.
All of the common law requirements for a condition running with
the land are present in the Pagel case, viz: (A) the intention of
the parties, (B) a benefit to the land, and (C) privity of estate.
Equity uses more lenient rules in enforcing covenants.5 The
grantee must have notice of the restriction, the grantor must have
intended to create a servitude, and the provision must benefit the
land. The equitable concept that the intent of the grantor may
6
be determined by viewing all the facts in retrospect is strongly
rejected in a few jurisdictions7 but is the law in Colorado as evidenced by recent cases.s A case very similar to the instant case
was decided in 1907, the court holding that a condition subsequent
9
could only be enforced by the parties to the deed. The court also
gave as dicta (because of the insufficiency of the allegations) to
the effect that such a condition could be enforced in equity by the
common grantees if these technical requirements were met:
1. a common grantor.
2. proof of a general plan.
3. the covenant has been entered into as part of a general plan.
4. the party has bought with reference to this scheme as to the consideration paid.
:'Gray v. Blanchard (Mass.) 1829, 8 Pick. 284. Floks v. Wichman, 128 Colo. 45, 260 P2 737.
.,Colo. Rev. Stat. Ch. 118, sec. 8-3 (1953).
Building restrictions and all restrictions as to the use of or occupancy of real property shall
be strictly construed and restrictions which provide for the forfeiture or defeasance of title to or
an interest in real property, and if the parcels of real property being owned by different persons
or individuals, then and in that event the restrictions shall be construed as applying only to the
property embraced in the restriction and owned by the party on whose property the violation of
the restriction occurred.
Tulk v. Moxhay, England, 1848, 2 Phillips 774.
Snow v. Van Dam, 1935, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224.
Werner v. Graham, 1919, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945.
*Taylor v. Melton, 130 Colo. 280, 274 P2 977. Seeger v. Puckett, 115 Colo. 185, 171 P2 415.
0Judd v. Robinson, 41 Colo. 222. Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 3 Colo. 82.
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5. is inserted in all deeds.
This case represented the rules of strict construction as applied to
equitable servitudes. Colorado's courts have since drastically reduced the technical requirements.
The second issue to be determined was if a scheme existed
and has been maintained since its inception.
The restriction expressly stated that the premises will be used
for dwelling houses only. The following discrepancies were proven,
none, apparently having been more than tacitly approved by the
grantor.
1. One of the plaintiffs was a veterinarian and had used part of
premises for the treatment of pets.
2. A professional carpenter testified that he performed some of
his work on his premises.
3. Several rental units were maintained.
4. A trailer court was allowed to be maintained on one block while
workmen constructed an R.E.A. line for a six month period. The
line was not connected with the restricted area.
6. In addition, a witness attempted to testify that one of the lots
was used as a dumping ground for trash by a filling station.
The grantor testified that the restrictions only came into existence when he sold the lots. The grantor had built granaries upon
block six and the court held that it was not a part of the restricted
area which was contrary to all of the testimony based on the beliefs of the grantees. The parol evidence rule was disregarded
and the grantor's testimony regarding the extent, nature, and
limits of the restricted area was allowed to stand. The question
which immediately arises is: What would have been the result
if the grantor had disavowed the existence of a general plan for
the benefit of the common grantees and had entered a cross-claim
alleging his right to the property by virtue of a reversionary interest? Surely, if the grantor's testimony could determine the
limits of a covenant, it would be equally admissible as a denial of
the covenant, in favor of a condition subsequent.
The plaintiff, in his brief, and the learned court quoted the
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Seeger case 0 as authority for the proposition that the restriction
in the Pagel case represented an equitable servitude. It does not
require careful reading to see that the facts and language used
are poles apart. The following quotation is the covenant used in
the Seeger case:
The grantee will erect no unsightly buildings upon
said premises or of such nature as to detract from the value
of neighboring premises, to keep said premises in a neat
and sanitary condition, and to refrain from erecting or
causing to be erected thereon any buildings other than a
residence and such barns, sheds, and outbuildings as may be
necessary in the reasonable enjoyment of said premises as
a place of residence.
The case may be further differentiated by the grantor having made
public a plat showing the proposed plan of restrictions and by
reliance on and adherenee to by all interested parties to a far
greater extent than the facts showed in the Pagel case.
The equitable rule again allowing plaintiffs to complain of
violations which they, themselves, were also guilty of has not
been discussed, even though the court ignored the application of
the rule.
CONCLUSIONS

This remains a very questionable case. It would be difficult
to find another in which so broad an interpretation was given to the
rationale of the implied reciprocal servitude. The Colorado Supreme Court probably gave an indication of judicial attitude toward
equitable servitudes by this statement, "The record contains nothing which even remotely indicates that the general plan or scheme
of the restricted use of these lots have been abandoned or altered.'
PROBABLE LAW ON EQUITABLE SERVITUDES

1. A restriction in the first deed of a plat is sufficient to bind all
who subsequently take with notice.
a. Notice may be actual, or constructive.
2. The grantor's intention is the controlling factor and may be
determined by viewing all of the facts in retrospect.
a. A nominal amount of acts by the grantor will be held as sufficient to establish his intent.
3. Technical wording may be disregarded despite the clear wording of the Colorado Statute covering restrictions on the use of
land.
a. Any interest subject to defeasance is to be strictly construed
in favor of the grantee.
0

' Seeger v. Puckett, 115 Colo. 185, 171 P2 415.
11 Pogel v. Gisi, ... Colo ......
1955 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 13, p. 479.
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